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P R E F A C E 
Arab Nationalism arose within the context of a 
Muslim Civilization at a tim'e when the latter had been 
seriously challenged and weakened by the encroachments of 
the West. Its conception of the community of the faithful 
- the Umma - was eroded and eventually abandoned by the 
Arabs without its replacement by a national political 
community able to command the loyalty of its members. 
The difficulties and weaknesses of Arab Nationalism 
cannot, however, be simply enumerated and asserted. In 
order to highlight its conflict-generating qualities, one 
must look at what has always detracted, and continues to 
detract, from it as a movement which all Arabs must and 
ought to follow. In this interaction most elementary, of 
course, is the fact that Arab Nationalism (Qawmiyya) itself 
has been transformed from the relatively conservative, 
traditional-based impulse to sovereignty and Arab Unity to 
the complex Nationalist (regionalist or Wataniyya) ideology 
of the contemporary Arab Nationalists. 
This dissertation does not suggest that such devel-
opment should follow any well-known pattern that precedes 
iv 
it elsewhere. It merely suggests that the form and nature 
of rule and political behaviour of the countries based on 
Ba' th Ideology have influenced more from their own expe-
rience than what the Arabs have inherited from their past. 
This study attempts to analyse contemporary Arab 
politics by seeking to examine the development and politi-
cal role of the Arab Nationalist Movement. It aims to dis-
pel some of the confusion which has surrounded the activi-
ties, methods and ideology of the movement of Arab 
Nationalism in the framework of the Ba'th Ideology. 
In the present study, the historical background of 
the Arab Nationalist Movement is considered in the light of 
the major events which dominated the Arab political scene 
from 1948 onwards. 
In this context, the first chapter deals with the 
political and intellectual record of the ideological groups 
of young Arabs from which the Ba'thists (Arab Nationalists) 
Movement emerged, in the Arab VJorld and particularly in the 
Arab East (Fertile Crescent). Second chapter of the 
dissertation gives an account not only of the activity of 
the various ideological groups who influenced to transform 
the political setting of the Arab World but also of the 
struggle among themselves for power to achieve the goal of 
Arab Nationalism (Qawmiyya). In the third chapter an 
attempt has been made to analyse the concept of Qawmiyya 
and VJataniyya as is understood in the theoretical framework 
of the Constitution of the Ba'th Party and of Iraqi Consti-
tution. The fourth and final chapter of the dissertation 
evaluates the organisational working of the Party in which 
the issues of local or regional political considerations 
have dominated over the issues of contemporary Arab 
Nationalism, as a result of which the concept of Arab 
Nationalism has wrongly been understood as an instrument to 
boost the parochial national interest, i.e. Wataniyya over 
Qawmiyya. 
(Md. H. J. Nasir) 
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CHAPTER - I 
POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND OF 
ARAB NATIONALIST MOVEMENT 
The last powerful f)olitical domination in Muslim 
experience was the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan-Caliph pro-
vided Muslims, regardless of race or ethnic group, with the 
object and sense of their religiously-derived political 
loyalty, and with the basis of community. Both the central 
and provincial bureaucracies of that great empire conducted 
government in the name of the spiritual-temporal head of 
the Islamic Community. When this great imperial edifice 
collapsed, a lack of authority and sense of community was 
bound to be felt and Arab Muslims in particular were 
affected by the loss for a long time. At the same time the 
experience complicated the problems of political and social 
change which arose from the challenge of the modern world 
specifically of an expanding modern Europe. When Arab 
Nationalists looked for political ideas or philosophies, 
they found a complex pattern which was new to them.However, 
the principal source of inspiration was undoubtedly by Arab 
Nationalism. Even the most conservative among the Arabs 
felt inspired by it. Despite there were several kind of 
regimes in existence from the extreme left to the extreme 
right, each espousing its own brand of ideology. 
The intellectual climate of Beirut and Damascus 
played an important role in shaping the thought of the 
founders of the Ba'th. Although Arab intellectuals 
protested the imposition of French language in the Levant 
they could not ignore the fact that the French had set up 
an efficient educational system in Syria and Lebanon. 
French Universities in Beirut and Damascus through main-
taining its standards of educational curriculum produced 
only a small number of educated people. Its special rele-
vance to Ba'th ideals was that its leaders were part of 
this highly educated minority. 
Michal Aflaq and Salahdin al-Beytar the two advo-
cates of this movement and the natives of Syria laid the 
foundation of the Ba'th as a political party, in Damascus 
in 1944. During his student years in France, Aflaq came 
under the influence of Marxism which was to have its perma-
nent impact on him and on his party, commonly known as Arab 
Ba'th (Resurrection) socialist party advocating radically 
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the idea of Arab Unity . 
1. Vatikiotis, P.J., Conflict in the Middle East 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1971), 
pp. 3-4. 
2. Roberts, David, The Ba'th and the Creation of 
Modern Syria (Croom Helm, London,1987, p.810. 
3. CARDRl, Saddam's Iraq, Revolution or Reaction? 
(Zed Books Ltd., London, 1982), p.9Z. 
Among the ideological parties that appeared 
specially in Syria and Iraq, the Arab Ba'th Party had 
attracted most attention, first, because of its compre-
hensive and revolutionary doctrine of Arab Nationalism and 
its association of nationalism with socialism, second, for 
its influence on Arab youth, its connections with army 
officers and third, because it was the only doctrinal party 
to reach power in Syria and also in Iraq. 
The Palestine debate in 1948, led to the emer-
gence of radical Arab Nationalism in place of liberal 
nationalism which was by then prevalent in the Arab World. 
In liberal nationalism, the Arabs had adopted the liberal 
western social and political philosophies. 
The radical Arab Nationalism in this phase rededi-
cated itself to fundamental social change in order to 
achieve their desired objectives of Freedom and Unity. 
Freedom was to be achieved from the colonial powers and 
unity had to be enshrined among the Arab countries. Hence 
the 1950s and 1960s witnessed the evolution of socialist 
doctrines in the popular movements and parties in the Arab 
World. The Ba'th doctrine based on the principles of the 
Unity and Freedom of the Arab Nation was accepted by the 
people at large popularizing the issue of the social trans-
formation at all levels of the Arab society. 
Ismael, Tareq Y., The Arab Left (Synacuse Univer-
sity Press, New York, 1976), p.13. 
Ibid., p.18, 
The growth of Aflaq's party was slow, and until 
the midforties it was restricted to high school students 
and graduates. It was only in July 1946, a few months 
after the evacuation of foreign troops, that the party 
issued its newspaper, al-Ba'th, and rented a party head-
quarters. On April 7, 1947, the first party conference was 
held and its constitution was approved. This was the 
official date for the founding of the party. The first 
branch to be established was the branch of Jordan in early 
1948, followed by the founding of branches in Lebanon in 
1949 and in Iraq in 1950.'' This led to the subsequent 
opening of lots of regional branches in these countries. 
There was need for coordination and cooperation among the 
regional branches. Therefore, a main branch was set up in 
1954 by the creation of a National Command to direct and 
guide the various branches of the party. Subsequently in 
the formative years, the Ba'th Party had gone through 
several major stages of development. Michal Aflaq as a 
fore runner of the movement had to resign from the Ministry 
of Education in 1942 because of his involvement in indoc-
trination at the expense of his teaching. Although his 
awkward personality and his Christian birth hardly fitted 
6. Hadded, George M. , Revolution and Military Rule 
in the Middle East: The Arab States, Pt. 1, 
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan (Vol. 2, Robert 
Spellor & Sons, New York, 1971), p.25. 
7. Ismael, Tareq Y., Op. cit.. No.4, p.24. 
him for political leadership, he was able to maintain his 
position as the national secretary general of the Ba'th 
Party and its recognised theorist. 
As a Chsitrian intellectual, Michal Aflaq was able 
to influence young muslims to whom religious loyalty had 
become subordinate to national loyalty. Aflaq often paid 
tribute to Islam as a necessary spiritual ingredient of 
Arab Nationalism. However, the Ba'th Party's position on 
secularism and Islam is opportunistic and confused and 
because of its opposition to fundamentalist and traditiona-
list Islam, its general radicalism and its placing Arab 
Nationalism above the Muslim religion, the Ba'th Party has 
never enjoyed popularity in orthodox Muslim circles and has 
been combatted by the Muslim Brethren. After the Ba'th 
Party was established, Aflaq left its command in the hands 
of other party members, especially Beytar, who often acted 
as the leader of the party, to perform executive and other 
functions. 
When the Ba'th Party was officially organised in 
1947, Michal Aflaq tried to control the party through the 
principle of collective leadership. This principle was 
embodied in National Command composed of representatives 
from various countries, each controlled by a Regional 
Command. Aflaq acted nominally as the Secretary General of 
the National Command, but in fact he failed to provide 
effective control over the party when differences among 
leaders arose and due to which the Central Command lacked 
Q 
effective coordination. 
Even the merger of the Ba'th Party with the Arab 
Socialist Party (ASP) in 1954 could not succeed and the 
lack of effective leadership continued evenafter. The Ba'th 
needed a charismatic leader, who could excite young Arabs 
to achieve their goals. At the same time Jamal Abdul Nasir 
had just emerged as a popular hero championing the cause of 
third world countries, following his successful arms deal 
9 
with the Soviet Union in 1955. Aflaq saw in him the 
leadership qualities and a Charismatic appeal which could 
provide the Arab Nation with its immediate need for an 
ideological party with an effective leadership. 
The immediate result of this need was that the 
Syrian and Egyptian made a political union, i.e. United Arab 
Republic. The Syrian Ba'th, which initially tried to 
capture some important political positions in 1956, agreed 
to dissolve itself, as the price to be paid for entering 
the union in 1958. This decision caused a major crisis 
when immediately after its formation the union began to 
8. Khaduri, Majid, Arab Contemporaries the Role of 
Personalities in Politics (The John Hopkins 
University Press Baltimore and London, 1973) 
pp. 219-20. 
9. Ibid. , p. 220. 
turn sour and the situation was developed for the exploi-
tation of Syria by Egypt. Just after the tense relation 
between Syria and Egypt after the revolution in July 1958, 
Michal Aflaq went to Baghdad to convince the new govern-
ment of Iraq to join the recently formed United Arab 
Republic. His proposal found favour with the Nasirite in 
Iraq in the name of Pan-Arabism, But contrary to Nasirites 
to Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), which was lukewarm in its 
approach towards the idea of Pan-Arabism and it was never a 
very important issue on its agenda. However, ICP was 
prepared to partially accommodate it, particularly its anti-
imperialist aspect which basically suited to its ideology. 
Hence, the Communists, the Ba'th, the National Democrats 
and Nationalists of the Istiqlal joined with the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party in a National Democratic Front in Iraq 
11 
which were in opposition to the monarchy in 1957. 
Thus, in the struggle for power the Ba'thist were 
mere onlookers. Their attempt to contribute their programme 
to Nasir's Pan-Arabist revolution had failed while they 
12 
were under the Egyptian's rule. But after Syria's 
secession, Nasir in order to steal a march over his rivals 
began implementing many of the policies espoused by the 
Ba'th. 
10. CARDRI, Op. cit.. No.3, p. 97. 
11. Ibid., p. 97. 
12. Tutsch, Hans E., Facets of Arab Nationalism (Wayne 
State University Press, Detroit, 1965),p.l02. 
8 
The Ba'th Party's prograime as envisaged is imbued 
with a high sense of mission. It wants first of all to 
13 
achieve "the Unity and Freedom of the Arab Nation". (For 
details see the appendix - A). The Ba'th Party tried to 
reach its goal of Arab Nationalism and Socialism through 
the revolution and strife. Further, it emphasized that 
re-distribution of the real estate, including a land 
reform, the nationalisation of public utilities, transfor-
mation, large-scale industries and natural resources are 
also needed for this purpose and could be realized through 
socialistic principles. The whole economy should be 
regulated according to a state plan. The Ba'thist state, 
according to its constitution, would also provide social 
security to the population and educational institutions 
according to the demand of Arab Nationalism. 
Ba'th and the Question of Palestine : 
For the Ba'th, the issue of Palestine has been 
viewed within the context of the advance and consolidation 
of the Arab revolution at the national level. After Arab-
Israel War in 1948, the Palestinian question was taken up 
as the main issue before the Arabs. The Ba'th constitution 
drafted in 1947 had no mention of the Palestine question. 
13. Ibid., p. 102 
14. Ibid., p. 103 
However, the party organised volunteer units that partici-
pated in the Palestine war of 1948 and opened a permanent 
Palestine Bureau in the same year. 
The struggle against Zionist colonialism in 
Palestine was considered the integral movement by the Arab 
Ba'th Socialist Party (ABSP). The Ba'th however maintained 
that "the liberation of Palestine could only been visua-
lised in the integral framework of an overall struggle of 
1 ft 
the Arab masses.' 
The Ba'thists rejected all the solution of the 
legitimisation of the so-called 'Israel' as a state. 
According to Ba'thist if this state is accepted, it would 
open the way for further penetration in the entire Arab 
Home Land. It was foolish of some Arab leaders to think 
that if properly persuaded, the leaders of the western 
imperialism would opt for supporting the Arabs against 
Israel. Many Arabs were hoping that given the tremendous 
Arab potential of oil wealth and their strategic position, 
it should not be difficult for the Arab lobbyists to divert 
17 
the Zionists' influence in America. 
15. Ismael, Tareq Y., Op. cit., No.4, p. 35. 
16. Berindranath, Dewan, Iraq: The Land of Arab Resur-
gence , (Press Asia International Pvt. Ltd. , 
New Delhi, 1979), p. 91. 
17. Ibid., p. 92. 
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Keeping these ideological facts, the Arab Ba'th 
Socialist Party (ABSP) had been advocating a unified Arab 
struggle for the liberation of Palestine. The ABSP, when-
ever the occasion had arisen, had been in the fore-front of 
calling for a united action from all Arab Governments 
1 8 
against the Zionist enemy and their supporters. 
The Arabs viewed Zionism as an extension of the 
European crusades, whose object had been to humiliate the 
Arabs and Islam. A return to the rules of Islam was thus 
envisaged as the only way for the Arabs to save itself from 
a total collapse. Exponents of Arab Nationalism on the 
other hand, considered sectarian politics a threat to Unity 
of the Arab Nation, and a divisive factor which tended to 
"Weaken the position of Arab internationally, and paralyzed 
their civil and social activities." 
The views of the latter group gained growing circu-
lation among the rising middle classes, including the 
military, and an increasing following among the University 
students and intellectuals of Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad. 
In later years, this tendency was reinforced by the rise 
to power of the Ba'th Party in Syria, and the pragmatic 
conversion of the Egyptian military regime to the ideas of 
18. Ibid. , p. 93. 
19, Sharara, A.L., Fi al-Qawmlyya al-Arabiya (on Arab 
_ Nationalism), (Beirut, 1957) , p. 7. 
11 
Arab Nationalism. Equally relevant to the development of 
the political situation which emerged after 1948 was the 
manner in which the new exponents of Arab Nationalism 
interpreted the causes and implications of the defeat. 
The intellectual activity of Arab nationalists, at this 
stage, centred on a reconsideration of three inter-related 
issues; the magnitude of the Zionist threat; the relation-
ship of the Arabs with the west, and the nature of the Arab 
20 
regimes which evolved after the second world war. 
The Palestine defeat undoubtedly accelerated the 
erosion of the political position of the ruling classes in 
the Arab countries. Occuring at a time when social and 
political conditions in the Arab world had reached a point 
of exacerbation, it acted as the catalyst of political 
change. In some Arab countries, Syria and Egypt, the 
reaction was immediate and final, in Iraq, it was latent; 
21 in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, it was not forthcoming. 
In 1947, the Ba'th Party in Syria had only a 
limited number of members, and no branches in any other 
Arab country. It was only after the shocking experience in 
Palestine that the party began to attract an increasing 
22 
number of followers. 
20. Kazziha, Walid W., Revolutionary Transformation in 
the Arab World^  (25, New Street Square, 
London, 1975), p. 203. 
21. Ibid., p. 13. 
22. Ibid., p. 14. 
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Thus, in the beginning of the second half of the 
20th century, the Ba'th Party had a profound influence, 
direct and indirect, on the minds of Arab youth, and on the 
development of events in the region. However, although it ' 
eventually advanced a plan for a Palestinian entity, it 
failed to implement its political ideas in general or those 
concerning the Palestinian entity in particular because it 
concentrated, precisely at the height of its achievement 
23 
on internal problems. 
The Ba'th Party basically faced a dilemma, which 
was in fact also Syria's dilemma, between the Pan-Arab 
aspiration (Qawmiyya) and the tendency of regionalism 
(Iqlimiyya) for its branches (especially the Iraqi branch, 
and at a later stage even the Syria branch which controlled 
the National Command). Ba'th Party leaders who were in 
the United Arab Republic (UAR) government in 1958-59 took 
great pains in dealing with this dilemma, especially after 
they had realized the 'Unity' as the principle of their 
doctrine. This dilemma was the context of their resigna-
tion from UAR government, and in the last analysis was also 
the main cause of the disintegration of the UAR in 
September 1961, hence, the solution of the dilemma by pre-
cisely strengthening the separatist regionalist tendency at 
the expense of the Pan-Arab principle.'' 
23. Shemesh, Moshe, The Palestinian Entity 1959-74 
Arab Politics and the PLO (Frank Cass & Co., 
Ltd., London, 1988), p.14. 
24. Ibid. , p. 15. 
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CHAPTER - II 
QAWMIYYA: A STRUGGLE OF IDENTITY AMONG 
THE IDEOLOGICAL GROUPS 
After the downfall of monarchic regime in Iraq in 
1958 there emerged a loose alliance among various groups 
i.e. the National Democratic Party (NDP), the Iraqi Commu-
nist Party (ICP) and the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (ABSP). 
This alliance has eventually been termed as the National 
Union Front (NUF), with the aims and objectives of indepen-
dence, social justice, land reforms, etc. A Supreme 
National Committee of NUF was thus appointed to act as a 
coordinating committee out of the representative parties. 
A number of other committees were also set up to perform 
specific functions under the direction of the National 
Committee. The main function of the Front was to coordi-
nate civil and military activities and to issue occasional 
proclamations to the public in order to prepare it for the 
Revolution. 
Khadduri, Majid, Republic Iraq: A Study in Iraqi 
Politics Since the Revolution of 1958(Oxfor^ 
University Press, London 1969) , p~. TTA. 
14 
After the establishment of the National Union 
Front, the Ba'th Party within itself played a more active 
role in the internal policies of the country. Within the 
NUF, the Ba'th and Communist Parties had certain character-
istics in common but they were opposed to one another in 
many other respects. Both believed in a single party 
system, the latter representing the Arab proletariat, the 
former on Arab Classless Society. The Ba'th demanded union 
with United Arab Republic (UAR) while the Communists, 
though accepting union in principle, opposed it in 
2 practice. 
The ideological conflict between Abdul Kareem 
Qasim and Abdus Salam Arif led to a friction between the 
Ba'thists and Communists. While Abdus Salam Arif demanded 
for Arab Union and advocated Iraq Union with Arab Republic 
of Egypt, Qasim was opposed to the idea and sought the 
3 
support of groups likely to oppose Ba'thists. Due to 
sharp differences between these two parties, the Communists 
extended their support to Qasim. Initially Qasim tried to 
enlist the support of the other moderate parties in order 
to counter the Ba'thist's propaganda and Arab Unity. But 
other parties were unable to cooperate with radical groups, 
2. Ibid. , p. 116. 
3. Ibid. , p. 116. 
15 
especially the Communists, who preferred to support Qasim 
directly. The moderate parties also were unable to arouse 
popular support since their activities in the past had been 
confined to literate groups, while the masses had fallen 
under radical influence. Moreover, the leaders of moderate 
parties, especially the National Democratic Party, were 
unwilling to give their support to Qasim without an 
assurance that the regime would be changed into a parlia-
mentary system. Qasim not only found the Communists ready 
to counter Pan-Arab propaganda, but also that they had 
greater influence over the masses, and they more often 
paraded the streets in support of him than did any moderate 
party. However, once committed to communist support, Qasim 
was never able to reconcile the Pan-Arabs, despite his 
rejection of Communist ideology, and his subsequent 
measures to curb their activities. And hence, by February 
1959 the so called NUF was broken up. The right-wing 
Ba'thists and Nationalists finally resigned, from their 
memberships of NUF because they were unwilling to be 
associated any longer with the growing Communist 
influence. 
Thus, it was recognised that the Iraqi Communist 
Party (ICP) had been one of the best organised Party and 
4. Ibid., p. 116. 
5. Trevelyan, H., The Middle East in Revolution (Mac-
millan 1970), p. 147. 
16 
its ideology was widely supported in the Iraqi masses. It 
had survived many crises and overcome several attempts to 
destroy it by the ruling authorities. In party's public 
pronouncements and 'confessions' it abandoned its earlier 
insistence on the distinction between the movement for 
national liberation through 'democratic revolution' 
organised by nationalists as a preliminary stage leading to 
the introduction of Socialism under a communist regime and 
the 'socialist revolution' led by the Communist Party. 
Despite the major role played by the Iraqi Commu-
nist Party (ICP) in bringing about the revolution of 1958, 
the party was circumscribed by the fear of a counter-
revolution against Qasim to such an extent that cooperation 
with Qasim had rendered its revolutionary role completely 
redundant. The role of ICP was no more than to protect the 
Qasim regime even when that regime had showed itself to be 
hostile to the aspirations of the masses and the ideology 
of the Communists. There was no misgiving in declaring 
that the ICP had been wrong in its characterisation of 
Qasim as a petty bourgeois to the extent that he was 
branded as the conscious representative of the national 
bou-geois Simultaneously he was fearful of the Increasing 
influence of ICP and the upsurge of the working class. 
6. Kelidar, Abbas (ed.), The Integration of Modern 
Iraq (Croom Helm London 19 79), p. 186. 
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Even though the ICP pursuaded a policy of seeking an 
alliance with him, accepting him the sole leader, a revolu-
tionary democrat as he was, bound to join the camp of 
working class. 
Dissatisfied, the Ba'thist, tried to overthrow the 
existing Communist dominated military government in Iraq, 
particularly in Mosul and Kirkuk. Qasim's government was 
charged with dangerous hostility towards the UAR and he was 
called an anti-Arab nationalist. These allegations were 
broadcast from the Mosul radio and citizens of Iraq were 
asked to join in the new revolt. Though the revolt was not 
successful, the failure of the uprising gave an opportu-
nity to the Communists, which had the support of the 
government to go on a rampage, attacking homes of the Mosul 
o 
bourgeoise and perpetrating all sorts of atrocities. 
In 1961-62 the Ba'th Party became increasingly 
active and its unlicensed, newspaper 'Al~Ishtiraki' (the 
socialist) was secretly circulated in ever increasing 
numbers. In the meantime, the party began to devise 
plans to overthrow the regime. Several plans were made 
during 1962, but directly or indirectly Qasim came to know 
about them because his chief of military intelligence kept 
7. Ibid., pp. 189-90. 
8. Kimball, Lorenzo, K. , The Changing Pattern of 
Political Power in Iraq 1958 to 1971 (Robert 
Speller & Sons Publishers, New York -
1972), p.96. 
9. Khadduri, Majid, Op. cit., No.l, p. 189. 
18 
a vigilant eye on the movements of the military. Meanwhile, 
the Ba'th Party intensified its underground agitation in 
order to prepare the public for the forthcoming uprising 
and to justify military rebellion on the ground that it was 
raised in response to popular demand. 
The general student strike was a manifestation of 
the dissatisfaction which the Ba'th Party exploited to 
create conditions favourable for the forthcoming military 
rebellion. Despite the strict secrecy of Ba'th contacts 
with the military, Qasim received intelligence reports of 
an impending plot against him in December 1962, but could 
know only the names of some conspirators and ordered for 
their arrest. 
On February 3, 1963, Qasim ordered the arrest of 
Salih Mahdi Ammash, one of the active Ba'th Officers. On 
the following day Ba'thist leaders met to review the 
situation. The military government, having received 
intelligence reports about the meeting, arrested Ali Salih 
al-Sadi and several other members. Acting therefore, Ahmad 
Hasan al-Bakr, head of the military group, issued instruc-
tions to fellow members to raise rebellion on February 8, 
two weeks earlier than planned, before Qasim moved to 
arrest other Ba'th leaders.""-^  
10. Ibid., p. 190. 
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The garrison at Abu Ghurayb in the suburb in West 
Baghdad, was the centre of defection against Qasim, where a 
strong tank force supported by nationalist officer of the 
nearby Ramadi province was totally in command of Ba'th 
Officers. 
As the revolutionary fever was totally against 
him, Qasim began to realize that the rebellion had become 
serious and tried to contact the rebel leaders to arrange 
an understanding with them, but his attempts were of no 
avail. The media had already fallen to rebel hands and the 
radio station building became its temporary headquarters. 
No sooner the National Council for the Revolutionary 
Command (NCRC) was set up by the Ba'th Party and its allies 
to replace the Qasim regime. Then the Council in 1963 
appointed Abdul Salam Arif as transitional president of the 
Republic. The NCRC adopted no new revolutionary principles 
but tried to turn public opinion against Qasim, who had 
betrayed the goals of the July 1958 Revolution. Except 
Arif, who was identified as the symbol of Pan-Aabism, 
the Ba'th Party of its leaders was not on the forefront 
in this revolutionary upheavals which took place in 
1963.-^^ 
In its first official statement the Council 
resolved that this revolution of the people and the armed 
11. Ibid., pp. 192-93. 
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forces must achieve two goals; first, to realise the 
people's National Unity, second, to achieve the 
participation of the masses in guiding and organizing the 
regime. Apart from this, the new Iraqi leaders who were 
now in power were seeking rapproachment with the United 
Arab Republic in order to strengthen their hold on the 
basis of Arab Unity before they introduced socialist 
measures of command and development. President Nasir, who 
was very carefully watching the development responded 
favourably to their call when he addressed to the masses in 
Cairo on February 21, 1963 that, "Egypt and Iraq are one 
nation having one aim and the people of UAR are whole-
heartedly with the Iraqi people". 
Consequently, negotiations for a federation 
between Iraq, Syria and Egypt were initiated in order to 
form a new United Arab Republic. Meetings modalities were 
discussed and meetings were organized in Cairo, Baghdad and 
Damascus during February and March that finally resulted in 
an agreement at Cairo on April 17, 1963, for the federati 
of these States. 
on 
12 
In this federation, on policy options, the Syrian 
and Iraqi Ba'thists clashed with Nasir, on three major 
issues. 
12. Kimball, Lorenzo, K., Op. cit., No.8, p.109, 
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1. Equality verses Inequality of the three 
parties. 
2. Collective verses personal leadership. 
3. The monopoly of Syrian Ba'thist across a 
border from which included pro-Nasirites. 
Consequently, that agreement was never implemen-
ted. The Ba'thist regime in Iraq was also having 
difficulties in its attempt to restore harmony and good 
will among the different se:^ments of the population. Due 
to this reason internal conflicts again appeared within the 
Iraqi Ba'thist regime and this led to the union downfall in 
13 late 1963. During the Ba'thist regime, eight months 
rule from February to November 1963, nothing constructive 
was achieved in the country. Staff Marshal Abdul Salam 
Arif dissolved the National Guard and assumed full control 
of the country. In place of National Guard, the Republican 
Guard known as elite corps of the regime was created. The 
Republican Guard acted as the Presidents' personal 
instrument, a system later developed to perfection by 
Arif's Ba'thist successors. Throughout his regime the 
country faced political turmoil till his death in a heli-
copter crash in April 1966. 
13. Ibid. , pp. 110-11. 
14. Ibid., p. 112. 
15. Ibid., p. 113. 
22 
The allied Ba'thist in their support to President 
Arif were also simultaneously convinced by Nasir's ideology 
and Iraqi versions of the Arab Socialism. Thus during this 
period, a policy of gradual extension of state control of 
economy through nationalization was adopted. However, 
apart from nationalization of Banks, and private manufac-
turing and trading units, there was no radical change in 
production. The worsening living conditions and growing 
unemployment were the causes of dissatisfaction among the 
population. The provisional constitution announced on 
April 29, 1964 did not end the state of Emergency and 
specified a three-year transition period before the return 
to normalcy. The power remained with the military and 
martial law was still in operation. The powers of the 
Military Governor General were transferred to the Prime 
Minister and the Military Courts were renamed as State 
Security Courts. The Prime Minister was also empowered to 
suspend all existing civil laws. 
These policies however were not in accordance of 
Ba'thist Policies what Michal Aflaq had advocated and 
practis&i in his cabinet colleagues that "These aims combine 
the causes of the masses, expressed through socialism and 
popular democracy, with the nationalist concepts which 
16. Ibid., p. 150 
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accompany them, exemplified in the plan to unite all the 
Arab countries, in order to correct national deviation, to 
abolish reaction, to recover from the lapse of secession 
and to realize all other national goals". 
Before his death in April 13, 1966, Arif asked 
Bazzaz to form a new cabinet in his attempt to take the 
army out of politics. This incited some of the army 
officers to rebellion which was quickly suppressed by the 
army chief of staff. On April 17, 1966 the National 
Defence Council and the cabinet,led by Bazzaz, met in a 
joint session and elected Abdur Rahman Arif, President of 
the Republic for one year and who subsequently assumed the 
office of the Prime Minister. 
In the following years, the party however 
continued to struggle against the military nationalist rule 
of the Abdur Rehman Arif in Iraq. The party's Central 
Committee meeting held in april 1965 called upon all 
opposition forces to unite their efforts to overthrow 
Arif's military regime. The third party conference in 
November-December 1967 re-emphasized the call for the over-
throw of the reactionary regime and for the setting up of 
coalition government to fulfil the task of the national 
democratic revolution. It endorsed armed struggle as the 
17. Committee Against Repression and for D.emocratlc 
Pvight in Iraq (CARDRI),Saddam' s Iraq, Revo-
lution or Reaction? (Zed Books Ltd, London, 
1986), p. 38. 
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means of struggle. The policy which was worked out in the 
conference helped to develop a joint action plan with other 
opposition forces in their joint endeavour to overthrow the 
1 8 
regime. Its opposition further aggrevated following the 
June 1967 Israeli attack on Egypt. Meanwhile, Communists 
also actively involved themselves in workers strike and 
popular resistance against the military regime. One of the 
factions, the military Nasirites, which tried to overthrow 
the Arif's regime by force, was headed by Brigadier Arif 
Abdal-Razzaq. Their attempt in June 1966 to over-throw his 
regime was quickly failed and president Arif began to feel 
more confident of his position. Meanv;hile, Premier Bazzaz 
proved more independent in his actions than the military 
had expected. He began to talk about the necessity of 
holding elections for a representative assembly so as to 
re-establish democracy and parliamentary rule. The 
military pressurized Arif to remove Bazzaz and the 
relations between President and Premier deteriorated 
19 
resulting in the latter's resignation in August 1966. 
Conditions began to deteriorate after Bazzaz's 
resignation. Bazzaz was succeeded by Colonel Naji Talib. 
Though conciliatory candidate to rival groups and moderate 
in approach, Talib was inactive and could not bring about 
18. Ibid., p. 150. 
19. Khadduri, Majid, Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi 
Politics SirTce 1968 (The Middle East Insti-
tute, Washington, DC - 1978), p. 18. 
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needed reforms during his tenure in Office. He was 
succeeded by General Tahir Yahya in 1967, who held the 
premiership under the President Abdus Salam Arif and proved 
to be ineffective administrator. Very soon, however, he 
was charged with corruption and in the subsequent years 
20 
Iraqi economy suffered badly. 
The humiliating defeat of Arabs in Arab-Israeli 
War of 1967 led to widespread unrest throughout the Arab 
World which could only be subsided through radical altera-
tions in political and economic policies in their 
respective Arab countries. The rival factions in Iran led 
by General Abdal-Aziz-al-Uqayli, former Minister of 
Defense, Abal-Ghanial Rami, former Deputy Minister and 
alongwith Premier and others put forth-demands for free 
elections, reversal of restrictive collectivist measures, 
21 
and a policy independent of the United Arab Republic. 
Meanwhile splits within the party, resulting from 
the action of Syrian leaders to expel Michal Aflaq and his 
supporters from the National Command affected the attitude 
of the Iraqi Ba'th leader towards the Ba'th regime in 
Syria. Sohel Jadid's Marxist Policy in Syria which was 
opposed to Aflaq's divided Ba'th leaders in Iraq into two 
camps. Those led by Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Husain 
20. Ibid., p.18. 
21. Ibid., p.18. 
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were opposed to Jadid and supported Aflaq. Others were in 
favour of Jadid's Marxist's policy and opposed to Aflaq's 
model of Arab Nationalism. After a number of purges aimed 
at eliminating dissidence, Bakr and Saddam were able to 
control the Regional Command and the crisis was finally 
resolved. By 1967, the Ba'th Party was in a position to 
22 
participate actively in opposition activities. 
At the same time the resolutions adopted at Khartum 
Summit in September, 1967 concerning the Arab-Israeli 
conflict v;as considered by Iraqi leaders to be ineffective. 
The Ba'th Party in its criticism of western policies, 
organised a massive rally in Baghdad. Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr 
while addressing the gathering criticized the Governments 
attitudes toward the West and Israel and charged Iraq's 
23 
rulers with corruption and inefficiency. In one of these 
demonstration of September 6, 1967, the resumption of war 
with Israel was demanded. Meanwhile out of the six minis-
ters council in Iraq, five Ministers resigned in protest 
against the decision to resume oil supplies to western 
countries, and a sixth because of the country's internal 
Kurdish policy. President Arif who was outside the 
country, cancelled an official visit to Algeria in order 
to fly back to Baghdad and successfully persuaded 
22. Ibid., p. 18. 
23. Ibid., p. 19. 
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his Ministers to withdraw their resignations. In order to 
tighten control over the opposition, a new press law was 
enacted where the licenses of sixteen privately-owned 
Baghdad papers were cancelled. They were replaced by five 
papers controlled by the Government. 
Despite these actions, opposition to Abdur Rahman 
Arif's regime continued. On January 12, 1968, students at 
Baghdad University, inspired by the opposition went on 
strike presumably on the ground of need for changes in the 
administrative process of the University and for a return 
to parliamentary Government. 
Meanwhile, the Ba'th Party along with other 
opposition leader's including Nasirites and other right-
wing Nationalists along with a dozen retired army officers, 
issued a statement on April 16, demanding the removal of 
Premier Tahir Yahya, the formation of a coalition Govern-
ment and the re-establishment of National Assembly with 
powers tc legislate and control the Government. Criticism 
of corruption was directed mainly against the Yahya 
Government, but since President Arif could do nothing 
constructive to inspire confidence, the regime as a whole 
was undermined and its replacement by another was expected 
at any moment. 
23. Ibid., p. 19. 
24. Ibid., p. 20. 
On July 17, 1968, ten years almost to the day 
after the July Revolution of 1958, the regime was over-
thrown for the fourth time by the military which indicates 
that the revolutionary process had not yet reached its full 
development. The reasons given for the change-primier 
Yahya's corruption, Kurdish protests and dissatisfaction, 
submission to foreign pressures, etc. were only circums-
tantial events and affectations that triggered the process 
of violent change, but the root cause lay in the fact that 
the regime had neither sufficiently consolidated nor 
25 
attained legitimacy by popular consent. 
Thus in putting forth the programme of social and 
economic development, Iraq had experienced a series of 
military revolutions since 1958 which introduced violence 
as a method of political change. True, even under the 
Monarchy, governmental changes were frequent, in which some 
form of violence was occasionally used and the average life 
of a cabinet was hardly more than eight months, but the 
method of change since 1958 had become much more violent 
and exceedingly difficult to check. Upon achieving 
power, the Ba'th leaders were determined to put an end to 
violent changes and erect a regime immune to military 
intervention. However the recurrence of clandestine 
activities and the intense rivalry among leaders and 
parties struggling for power that often disrupted construc-
25. Kadduri, Majid, Op. cit., No. 20, p.21. 
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tive work in the past had prompted the Ba'th leaders to 
proceed slowly and cautiously in seeking cooperation with 
rival elements and groups. But in the long run the only 
sure way to reduce and ultimately put an end to such 
activities was indeed to widen the popular base by throv;ing 
open the door of political participation to all without 
crippling restrictions. 
The first-step in the right direction toward 
political participation was the establishment of the 
progressive National Front, composed first of two parties -
the Ba'th and the Communist parties - and then of other 
• . -^ ^ 26 
'progressive' parties and groups. 
Nevertheless, in reviewing the events leading to 
the fall of Yahya regime it is possible to conclude that 
one of the fundamental aims of the Iraqi Revolution had 
been, still is to assert nationalism as the basic cohesive 
force of so diverse and heterogeneous society. in the 
past, Islam provided a super-structure which transcended 
all loyalties, ethnic or culture, and remained as the basis 
of unity until the Islamic State was divided into separate 
political entities. After World War I, nationalism began 
to replace Islam as the foundation of the new political 
systems, and only a few cherished the hope that the Islamic 
State, in its classical form, might be re-established. 
26. Ibid., p. 179. 
27. Khadduri, Majid, Op. cit., No.l, p. 300. 
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Iraq, composed of various ethnic and religious 
groups, has accepted nationalism as the basis of its policy 
ever since she was established as a separate political 
entity in 1921. As has been seen, from 1921 to 1968 Iraq 
had not made up her mind whether she wanted to develop an 
Iraqi nationalism, as presumably was implied in her 
constitution, or to stress Arab Nationalism, with the 
ultimate possibility of merging in an Arab Union. This was 
one of the unresolved issues which generated the 
revolution, and remained one of the problems which the 
revolution has yet to solve. The idea of nationalism, 
however, though stressed by revolutionary leaders, has not 
yet penetrated to the masses sufficiently to supercede 
religious, and consequently confessional, feeling. As a 
result, the revolutionary leaders have wavered between the 
broader notion of Arab Nationalism and the narrow concept 
of Iraqi Nationalism, because the former has been strongly 
opposed by Kurds and tacitly by Shi'is. Before Iraq can 
decide on what brand of nationalism she will choose, the 
Revolution's principal functions must be to prepare the 
religious communities to subordinate their confessional to 
national considerations. The encouragement of such a 
composite national feeling should be one of the chief tasks 
of the Revolutionary regimes; without its no political 
system, however strongly supported by one community or 
another, can endure, as it cannot unless it commands the 
respect of all the communities. 
CHAPTER - III 
QAWMIYYA VS WATANIYYA: A FRAMEWORK FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Ba'thist Iraq's experimentation with revolutionary 
change, indeed the experimentation of other Arab countries 
with similar changes, demonstrates that despite the desire 
to achieve progress and modernization quickly, the process 
had remained inevitably slow and may take long transitional 
periods. 
To establish an enduring political system, the 
elite of any country undergoing change will have to erect 
not merely a political structure but also to provide the 
conditions under which the new system can operate. Arab 
revolutionary leaders often sought to fashion the political 
system they desired in accordance with a foreign or an 
ideal model considered to be campatible with their 
country's needs, but failed to enable the public to 
participate in its processes. In the Arab countries that 
have followed the evolutionary procedure, the leaders seem 
to be prepared to modify or adopt the political processes 
to their country's needs without changing them by violent 
means. In either case public participation is essential, 
not only to establish legitimacy and secure public support 
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so that the system may endure, but also because progress 
and development cannot be steadily achieved unless the 
public participates in the political processes and gives 
1 
practical expression to their real interests. 
The movement to provide Constitutional charters to 
the Government of third world countries of West Asia -
embodying the fundamental principles of government and a 
bill of rights was inspired by the European Constitutional 
Law. The Traditional Islamic Law even before did formulate 
general principles of governing and exercise of authority 
of rulers. Modern Constitutionalism, a movement to limit 
authoritarianism, was initiated by European nations which 
sought to curb the powers of autocratic rulers It was 
emulated by Muslim reformers who strove for a similar 
objective to limit the traditional powers of their rulers 
which originally derived from Islamic sources but no longer 
regarded as compatible with Muslim interests. In a broader 
sense European Constitutionalism which inspired the Islamic 
thinkers dealt with the political system as a whole by 
which the people can participate in it, as well as with the 
2 
ways and means of exercising authority by rulers. 
1. Xhadduri, Majid, Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi 
Politics since the Revolution of 1958, 
(Oxford University Press, London 1969), 
pp. 299-300. 
2. Xhadduri iJajid, Political Trends in the Arab World, 
( uie Johns Hopkins Press Ba^ltimore & London, 
1970), pp. 28-29. 
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Reformers were already grappling with the notion of 
Constitutionalism by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, but were cautious that a drastic step of this 
description might arouse the opposition of the forces of 
conservatism and inertia. Their agitation reached its 
highest pitch in 1866, when they submitted a petition to 
the Sultan in the form of a letter accompanied supposedly 
by draft constitutional proposals, and urged him to take 
the lead in the constitutional - representative movement. 
The religious groups fearing that the liberal 
constitutional movement lead to the ultimate destruction of 
Islam, came to the inescapable conclusion that the support 
of authoritarianism rather than its destruction would best 
serve their interests. Towards the end of the nineteenth 
century the realization began to grow more and more among 
liberals that to achieve reforms by peaceful means was no 
3 
longer possible. 
Following World War I, the Caliphate was formally 
dissolved in Turkey and subsequently relapsed in Arab 
lands. The new rulers accepted democratic institutions 
without attempting to adopt them to existing conditions. 
The people were neither able nor seriously permitted to 
participate in the political process, while intense 
3. Ibid., p. 31. 
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rivalries divided leaders who were vying for power. Democ-
racy failed to command either the respect or the allegiance 
of the common people in the way that God's Law and the 
Islamic System had done in the past. Above all, democracy 
failed to rehabilitate Islam and to repair injured Arab 
pride. But apart from the solgan "back to Islam", the 
religious groups offered little in constructive reform 
programmes which might have combined the best of Islamic 
and Western concepts. The conflict between religious and 
liberal groups remained unresolved; the liberals denounced 
the Islamic system as incompatible with modern conditions 
of life, and the religious leaders, witnessing an impending 
breach with Islam- such a breach had actually taken place 
in Turkey, vented their wrath- upon those in authority for 
permitting this change. In practice, Islam proved an 
impediment in the development of democratic institutions, 
although religious apologists continued to maintain that 
Islam was inherently democratic. 
Not until the establishment of the Monarchy in Iraq 
its Constitutional form took shape with the submission of 
the organic law to a constituent Assembly for approval. 
The law was thus promulgated on March 21, 1925, and 
accepted as the constitution of Iraqi Kingdom until the 
4. Ibid., p. 42. 
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revolutionary over throw of the Monarchy in 1958. 
As far as its provision, it was modelled on the 
list of British Constitutional system and provided for a 
bicameral legislature. Islam was declared the official 
religion of the state, and so the Arabic its official 
language. Soverei^^nty was stipulated as residing in the 
people and represented "a trust confided by them to King 
Faisal, son of Husain, and to his heirs after him". Legis-
lative power was vested in parliament and the King. The 
powers of the King were considerable within the Consti-
tutional framework. The constitution did not, however, 
grant the king the express right to dismiss the cabinet, 
until it was so amended in 1943. The King was the Head of 
State and Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces. He 
confirmed laws supervised their execution, issued orders 
for general elections, opened parliament; adjourned it or 
dissolved it. When parliament was not in session, the King 
had the power to issue ordinances having the force of law. 
He had a suspensory veto over legislation, but he had to 
return draft bills to parliament within three months or in 
urgent cases within fifteen days. 
5. Harari, Maurice, Government and Politics of the 
Middle East (Prentlnce Hall, the Englewood 
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During the thirty odd years since the Ba'th's 
principles and programmes first spelled-out in its consti-
tution, tne party had been in the thick of political 
struggle learning from its own experiences as well as from 
its interactions with other revolutionary movements in 
different parts of world especially in Arab World. 
The Movement of nationalism focuses on the notion 
of'Uatan', with all its positive dimensions which contempo-
rary political thought has constantly emphasised. The Pan-
Arab model of Ba'th, however, reduces the scope of this 
notion and diminishes its significance. In general terms, 
Pan-Arabism or Arab Nationalism as incident in Ba'th 
Ideology gives much more importance to the notion of nation 
(Umma ) . 
In the nationalist model, the term'Watan''is used to 
refer to a specific geographical area that constitutes the 
homeland of citizens bound to each other by legal and 
emotional ties, and who belong to a sovereign state. In 
the Ba'th model of Pan-Arabism, hov;ever, the^  term'\Ja tan' is 
used in the sense of union, or league. Legally speaking, 
the notion watan refers to a league comprising as group of 
sovereign states, with their respective citizens being 
identified in relation to their respective fatherlands. 
Consequently, the meaning of watan looses its precision and 
becomes somewhat obscure and abstract. 
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According to Aflaq the notion of watan, or Arab 
watan signifies, basically a geographical area and reflects 
a desire for unity more than it denotes the idea of natural 
ties . 
Theories of Arab Unity may well differ on the 
issues of relationships between Unity and Freedom, or 
Liberty and Socialism, or even on the relationship between 
national (or regional) action and Pan-Arab action. 
However, behind all these differences, there is always one 
constant clear element, i.e. the notion of an Arab Umma. 
Many concepts have been used to define this notion; its 
role in the history of humanity. These attempts at the 
later stages have given birth to a new conception of the 
notion of nation in Ba'th Ideology, which indicates that 
the term is used in a specific sense in connection with 
modern Arab life. It was against this backdrop that the 
Ba'th set-out to present an independent Arab approach to 
national and world problems based on Arab interests and 
aspirations. The first phase in the ideological development 
of the Ba'th was marked by an emphasis on liberation from 
foreign domination. 
It was at that time when the idea of Arab Unity was 
gaining momentum, the partition of Palestine came into 
existence. In the meantime the unresolved situation in 
Palestine gave rise to a series of coups not only in 
7. Engineer, Asghar Ali (ed.), Islam and Revolution, 
(Ajanta Publication Jawahar Nagar-India,1984) 
p. 47. 
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Ba'thist Iraq, but also in neighbouring countries. Syria 
alone witnessed three coups in 1949, Lebanon and Egypt one 
each in 1952. The excess of military despotism in Syria 
even at one stage drove the Syrian Ba'th leaders into exile. 
Ba'th Party learned to appreciate the value of democracy. 
In Aflaq's view this formed the milestone in the evolution 
o 
of the Ba'th's ideology. 
The idea of Socialism had long been the subject of 
discussion in the Arab World, but Arab Nationalists had 
been showing no interest in it mainly because the over-
riding principle of Arab Union was uppermost in their 
minds. It was at this state that the Arab Ba'th thinkers, 
not only attempted to reconcile the two divergent view 
points but also demonstrated that Arab Union cannot be 
achieved unless it is based on Socialism. Opinion differed 
as to which of the two principles was proceeding the 
others. Young Arabs who had an interest in the Socialist 
Communist Movement, but had certain reservations about its 
international character were fascinated by the appeal of 
the Ba'th in combining the dual goal of Arab Union and 
Socialism. The Pan-Arabists, on the other hand, whose 
principal aim was Arab Union, saw an advantage in broaden-
ing their programme by the inclusion of socialism, which 
8. Ibid., p. 48. 
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attracted a greater number of younger Arabsand asserted the 
9 
spread of Communist propaganda. 
Hence the establishment of the Arab Ba'th (Resur-
gence) Socialist Party in April 1947, poineered the ideas 
which have now become a driving force behind the Arab 
struggle to create a unified progressive national state 
that could hold its existence among the nations of the 
world. Keeping the hope of Unity and the dream of the 
meaningful national aim, the Ba'th promised to eliminate 
the atmosphere of drift, disarray and dispair which defaced 
10 the Arab politics over the previous three decades. 
The first original statement of the Ba'th princi-
ples and programme was incorporated in the constitution 
adopted by the founding congress of the party on April 7, 
1947. The programme of the Ba'th was based on three 
principles, (1) Unity (2) Freedom (3) Socialism. Its 
concepts of the Arab Nation marked a shift in Arab 
Nationalist thinking. It presented the vision of an Arab 
homeland inhabited by the Arab Nation, bounded by the 
Taurus and Push-i-Kuh Mountains, the Gulf of Basra, the 
Arabian Sea, the Ethiopian Mountains, the Sahara, the 
Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. This concept of 
9. Khadduri, Majid, Republican Iraq (Oxford 
University Press, London 19'69), p. 247. 
10. Engineer Asghar Ali, Op. cit.. No.7, p. 47. 
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nation and its homeland was inspired by the will of the 
Arab people to unite, to be free, and to be given the 
opportunity to make a place for Arab personality in history 
and cooperate with other nations in all matters that would 
help in the steady advance of humanity towards welfare and 
11 progress. 
Secondly, Unity was considered to be an essential 
pre-requisite for Nationalism since its fulfilment calls 
for the Freedom of the individual. The party believed that 
sovereignty belongs to the people which alone is the source 
of all authority and leadership. The value of the state 
was measured by the support it received from the masses, 
and that its sanctity - a contingent the Freedom they would 
enjoy in the choice of their government. It was, moreover, 
committed to create objective conditions conducive to the 
exercise of full rights by the citizens in this individual 
capacity as well as in national life. These include 
establishment of a constitutional representative system 
requiring the executive to be responsible to the 
legislative, independence of the judiciary, and a single 
code of laws for all citizens in harmony with the spirit of 
12 the present age. 
11. Ibid., p. 43 
12. Ibid., p. 43, 
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The third fundamental principle of the Ba'th 
ideology was Socialism, which was defined as an essential 
ingredient of Arab Nationalism because 'it is the ideal 
system which allows the Arab people to increase its 
production, builds its morale, and strengthens the ties of 
brotherhood among its members'. Specifically, the Ba'th 
advocated for equitable distribution of wealth, national 
ownership of major industries, natural resources and public 
utilities, limitation of private land ownership on the 
basis of ability of the proprietor to utilize his land 
fully without exploiting the labour of others. The Ba'th 
ideology, on the whole represented workers participation in 
the management of factories and fixation of their share in 
the profits by the state. Particularly, the constitution 
also recognized the rights of private property and of 
inheritance. The manifest incompatibility of this 
provision with the party's commitment to Socialism aroused 
13 
much controversy in later years. 
To achieve its two-fold objective of comprehensive 
Arab Unity and Socialism, the Ba'th adopt this course of 
revolution and strength. The driving force behind this 
revolution had been the concept of the Arab mission 
onibodyin- in the Ba'th battle cry,one Arab Nation with an 
immortal mission. Evidently, the Ba'th did not at this 
13. Ibid. , p. 44. 
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stage, subscribed to the new concepts of the notion of 
nation. 
The Arab Nationalist doctrine dictated by Michal 
Aflaq had at its heart a call for a revitalization of Arab 
Society. This was the reality of the sacred mission of the 
party and was what Aflaq intended to convey when he used 
the word INQILAB. Thus, in a talk given to a party branch 
in February 1950, he said that revolution is that prime 
propelling power, that powerful psychic current, that 
mandatory struggle, without which the re-awakening of the 
14 
nation is not to be understood. 
Thus, to Michal Aflaq INQILAB means Orientation of 
the masses rather than of the system. Since the change in 
the system would allow automatically with the change in the 
interior transformation of the masses. This interpretation 
of INQILAB as transformation brought a considerable 
influence in the Ba'th Party in the forties early 
fifties. As the draft constitution of Ba'th Party in its 
article 6 states.: - The Arab Ba'th Party is a revolu-
tionary party; it believes that its chief aims of 
resurrecting Arab Nationalism and building Socialism can 
only be achieved by transformation and struggle . . . Hence 
the party decides in favour of.... the transformation of 
14. Ibid., p. 26. 
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the present rotten situation, a transformation which is to 
include all sections of life, intellectual, economic, 
15 
social and political. 
Article 5 of the Constitution asserted that 
sovereignty belonged to the people, who were the source of 
all authority in the state. At the same time, the Ba'th 
Party had the special programme of working to raise the 
people's economic and cultural standards, so that they 
would be able to exercise their rights in their national 
streams, while all citizens of the Arab State could 
participate in these lines, citizenship would be denied to 
those who would advocate or join an ethnic anti-group or 
who forsook the Arab fatherland for colonialist end. 
Freedom of association in clubs, parties, youth organi-
zations and others would obtain only under the jurisdiction 
1 f\ 
of the Arab Nationalist idea. 
Apart from Constitutional Provisions the Ba'thist 
leader like Michal Aflaq and Beytar concentrated more on the 
issues like liberation from imperialism and Arab Unity. 
The achievement of Unity did not seem likely as long as 
reactionaries and exploiters controlled certain Arab 
governments; it was only through their ouster, necessarily 
15. The Appendix A, - The Constitution of the Ba'th 
Party. 
16. Ibid. 
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by force, and their replacement by liberated regimes would 
promote the cause of Unity. Thus, in Syria, Michal Aflaq 
and Salauddin Beytar came to view the electoral process as 
a useful means of gaining power, but they were prepared to 
abandon it when at the end of 1957, the greater goal of a 
Ba' th dominated Unity between Syria and Egypt appeared to 
be attainable. 
The word 'Socialist'was not included in the Party's 
name,i.e. Arab Ba'th Socialist Party until the merger with 
Akram Howrani's Arab Socialist Party in 1953. In fact, the 
term Socialism as is used by Michal Aflaq in his early 
writings occupied far less of his thought than did Unity, 
18 
resurrection, independence, and nationalism. 
Despite, party constitution shows no sign of 
Marxist thought, it describes the party as socialist 
declaring that Socialism is a necessity which emanates from 
the depths of Arab Nationalism, Socialism constitutes the 
ideal social order for the Arab people', as mentioned in 
19 
article 4 of the party's constitution. 
17. Engineer,Asghar All, Op. cit.. No.7, p. 31. 
18. Ibid., p. 33. 
19. Ibid., p. 32. 
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There were, of course, a number of reasons for the 
Ba'thist ideologues to concentrate more on the theoritical 
assumption than to the practical one. Party activity 
concentrated on transforming the existing political and 
social structure. Since in its formative years,achievement 
of power was a remote possibility, the party activity 
basically concentrated in the political field, and party 
writing naturally was heavily political. 
Secondly, the bulk of the material produced by the 
Ba'thist writers in the 1947-57 was based on the assumption 
that the first requirement of Arab Society was a thorough 
change in its attitude,i.e. an interior renaissance. 
Thirdly, the call for the Ba'thist Party was 
regarded the call for Arab Nationalism and Freedom,for the 
replacement of those who collaborated with imperialism 
20 
against the Arabs. 
After the Ba'th Party came to the power firstly in 
1963 and subsequently in 1968 in Iraq it tried to develop 
the country in accordance with the party's goals and guide-
lines. President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, holding the post of 
Prime Minister in addition to the Presidency in 1958, 
became nominally the head of all branches of Government and 
the national forces. He also presided over the meeting of 
20. Devlin, John F., The Ba'th Party: A History from 
its Origin to 1966 (Hover Institution Press), 
p. 37. 
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Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the Regional 
Command (RC) of the Ba'th Party. President Hasan al-Bakr, 
as Commander-in-Chief, subsequently appointed Harden al-
Tikrit his minister of Defense and al-Ansari, the Chief of 
Army Staff. It showed that the Army completely passed 
under Ba'thist control with no opposition what so ever 
against the new regime subsequently promulgated a temporary 
constitution. It was designed to define the framework of 
the country's evolving political structure, based on 
Ba'thist teachings and experiences. Later on, ultimately, 
with minor revision it became the basis of the country's 
permanent constitution. The form of government, envisioned 
as enshrining Ba'thist principles and goals, was democratic 
and socialist under which the individual would be able to 
develop his personality, cultivate the Arab heritage, and 
live in Freedom unfettered by social and economic 
differencials. 
The first temporary constitution, exclusively of 
its own was prepared by a committee of three jurists on 
September 21, 1968. The three jurists under the Chairman-
ship of President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, prepared a draft 
constitution drawn essentially from previous constitutions 
and the country's constitutional experiences within the 
framework of ba'thist guidelines. Before it was submitted 
to the RCC for approval, the draft provided for a 
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parliamentary form of government, but the legislative and 
executive powers were temporarily entrusted to the Revolu-
tionary Command Council (RCC) until parliament was 
convened, only decrees, not laws, were in principle to be 
21 
issued by the RCC, pending final approval of parliament. 
After a thorough scrutiny by the RCC, the draft was consi-
derably revised to meet the immediate needs. 
The machinery of government then was proposed to be 
composed of four principal branches in the constitution: 
the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the National 
Assembly, the Presidency and the Judiciary. The first was 
given the supreme authority in the land; until the National 
Assembly was convened, the RCC exercised not only exclusive 
but also legislative powers. The RCC was composed of 22 
22 
members elected from the Regional Command by a majority. 
These members enjoyed full immunity from trial and arrest. 
Its functions included the formulation of general policy 
and the approval of plans and projects for development 
including defense and foreign policy. 
The proposed constitution re-affirmed internal 
unity as a priority and declared the people of Iraq to be 
composed of two major nationalities' - Arabs and Kurdish. 
21. Khadduri, Majid. , Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi 
Politics Since 1968 TThi Middle EaiE 
Institute, Washington, D.C. 1978), p. 34. 
22. Ibid. , p. 35. 
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The rights of all regardless of race or religion, were to 
be equally protected. The Arabic language was recognised 
as official for the entire country and Kurdish was declared 
equally an official language in the Kurdish provinces. The 
rights of other ethnic or religious groups were given full 
recognition by the constitution. Perhaps for the first time 
in the modern history of Iraq, special encouragement were 
given to the minority groups for the study of its cultural 
heritage. 
The socialist principles as were already in 
practice were more strongly emphasized in the revised 
constitution of the Republic. The state itself undertook 
to achieve this objective by continuous planning and 
regulating the social and economic system. The country's 
natural resources and the instruments of production were 
declared to be owned collectively by the nation -the state 
undertook the responsibility to exploit them for the 
23 benefit of the people as a whole. 
Above all, Islam, the religion of the majority, was 
declared to be the official religion of the state; however 
religious freedom to other groups was also recognised. For 
the first time Islam was considered to be the fundamental 
source of the constitution and Islamic jurisprudence as its 
23. Ibid., p. 34. 
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governing heritage. However, later on in its revised 
constitution, only a lip service was paid to Islam by 
stating merely that 'Islam is the religion of the state', 
deleting the reference to Islam as 'the fundamental source 
of the constitution' and to Islamic jurisprudence as the 
24 law governing inheritance. 
Nevertheless, even at this stage some aspects of 
confessionalism remain visible in the Ba'th Constitution. 
In the Arab countries the majority belong to only one of 
the two main Islamic sects, for as Syria, Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia, religion may well become a valuable ingredient of 
nationalism, but in countries where confessionalism has 
been deeply rooted, especially in Iraq, a secular form of 
nationalism will be absolutely necessary to overcome 
confessional under-currents. 
This theoretical struggle had its political 
counterpart in terms of state behaviour and policy. The 
increasing polarization within the party came to be viewed 
as a struggle between progressives and conservatives. The 
progressives were thought of as strong supporters of 
distributive justice, land redistribution, industriali-
zation, nationalization of capital, greater collaboration 
with the socialist states, and Arab political unity. They 
were Arab Nationalists par excellence. On the other hand 
24. Appendix B., The Interim Constitution of the 
Republican Iraq, Article 4. 
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the conservatives came to be viewed as supporters of a 
laissez faire economic system; they were considered 
gradualist in approach, more religiously inclined, not 
concerned with the redistribution of wealth, more open to 
collaboration with the capitalist system of power, and 
lukewarm to the concept of immediate Arab Unity. And 
whereas progressives advocated the participation of the 
masses in politics, the conservatives were more 
restrictive. 
On the whole the Ba'th Ideologies collectively can 
claim certain successes and failures.The general opinion in 
the Arab World holds that the Ba'th Party have failed in 
two important respects: they have failed to achieve Arab 
Unity, still one of the greatest Arab aspirations; and they 
have failed to modernize the Arab system sufficiently to 
withstand Israeli aggression and expansion. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
THE BA'TH PARTY AND THE EMERGENCE OF REGIONAL 
IDENTITY: A CASE STUDY OF IRAQ 
The structure of the Ba'th Party in its operation 
is cellular, like an intelligence network, designed to 
promote secrecy and ensure security in case any one of the 
calls is exposed. Hence its basic unit is cell (Halqa) 
consisting of three to five members. Members are divided 
into three classes. In descending order they are full or 
active members, who participate in meetings, voting, 
elections etc., probationers, and supporters. As a rule 
every active member has to be in each of the two lower 
classes for eighteen months. A cell so constituted may be 
either geographical, based on a place or neighbourhood or 
functional, based on an organisation. 
The following is the way in which the system works 
in theory. Members of one cell will not normally know the 
membership of another unless they meet at a higher level, 
or one of them is a public figure, a Ba'thist may not know 
whether another national (Syrian or Iraqi) is a Ba'thist 
or not. For the same reasons of secrecy there is no Israel 
communication between the cells, only contact is through 
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the higher unit (Even units higher than the cell do not 
have lateral communication but in each case operate through 
the next higher unit). The higher unit appoints the 
secretary of each lower unit under its jurisdiction. 
Above the cell is the section (firqah), consisting 
of three to seven cells. This would have its own elected 
leadership. After the section is the shuba which contains 
three to five sections. The next higher unit is a branch 
(fir) consisting of thirteen members for example in Syria 
with an elected leadership and secretary. One of these 
might cover a caza or liwa (governorate) or a city. That 
is the civilian organisation. A parallel and quite 
independent military organisation is made up in more or 
less the same way. 
The Pan-Arab organisation of Ba'th Party throughout 
the Arab World is theoretically elected by the Regional 
Commands in various countries but that system is in 
abeyance sine die on account of the rift between the two 
largest regional groups, namely Syria and Iraq. Each group 
has, however, in the past gone through the ritual of 
convening a Pan-Arab Congress of its own. 
The Regional Command holds a Pan-Arab Congress in 
addition to its Regional Congress, and there elects a 
Roberts, David., The Ba'th and the Creation of 
Modern Syria (Croom Helm London, 1987),p.77. 
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delegation to the Pan-Arab Congress of the whole Ba' th 
Party meeting. The Pan-Arab delegation consists of all the 
members of the Regional Command in question plus sufficient 
extra members to make up a number which is fixed in 
proportion to the total number of members of the Ba'th 
2 
Party in the country in question. 
In Syria itself, with a much greater membership, 
the electoral procedure is regionalised. That is to say, 
the Syrian representation at the Pan-Arab Congress would 
consist of the whole of the Syrian Regional Command plus 
representations from Damascus, Homs,etc. Inevitably there-
fore, and on a numerically equitable basis, a full Pan-Arab 
Congress would be dominated by the Syrian delegation. 
According to Iraqi's Ba'th Constitution, the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) is the supreme insti-
tution in the state, and hence does not take orders even 
from the Pan-Arab or regional party leaderships. The RCC 
is independent of the Regional Leadership (RL) as is 
implied in the second Iraqi interim constitution of the 
Party. According to the constitutions, the RCC and its 
Chairman are the supreme executives and legislative 
authorities, and in special cases also form the supreme 
3 
Judicial body. 
2. Ibid., p. 78. 
3. Appendix - B, The Interim Constitution of Ba'thist 
Iraq. (Part four, the Institutions of the 
Republic of Iraq)Chapter one. The Revolutionary 
Command Council) 
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The RCC Chairman is also the Secretary General of 
the Regional Leadership. Ttie Chairman of the RCC is by defini-
tion also the President of the Republic and Commander-in-
Chief of the armed forces. During most of his rule as RCC 
Chairman, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr shared his wide-ranging 
powers with Saddam Husain. But Husain concentrates al-
most all the powers in his own hand to the extent that the 
members of the RCC derive their actual authority from hire 
since he became the Chairman of RCC in July 1979. 
The Regional Leader (RL) of the Ba'th Party follows 
unit of Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in order to 
maintain the hierarchy. The formal leadership between the 
RL and RCC was somewhat vague due to conflicting definition 
in various official documents. In an apparent contradic-
tion to the constitution, the Party's Eightu Regional 
Congress of January 1974 stated that on 30 July 1968, "the 
RL assumed its role of leading the revolution through the 
RCC". In terms of party doctrine, at least, resolutions of 
party congress are perceived as binding on the country's 
political leadership. Thus, a well informed source 
describes RL as positioned "above and outside the formal 
government system". There is no doubt that since 1974 the 
resolution of regional party congresses have been of 
paramount importance, if not serving as guidelines, then 
at least legitimizing the regime's policies retroactively 
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and facilitating their pursuit. The second interim 
constitution specifies that new RCC members be recruited 
from the RL also testifies to the importance of the 
latter. 
The Pan-Arab leadership of Ba'th Party and the Pan-
Arab Congresses are important for the legitimization of the 
decisions taken by the RCC and RL. Since 1974, however, 
they have played an extremely limited role in the decision 
making process. 
The Pan-Arab leadership also differs greatly from 
the RL in its membership structure, as most of its members 
are not Iraqis. Hence, according to the 1970 interim 
constitution (Clause 62), they can never join the RCC, 
whose members must be native Iraqis born to parents who are 
both native Iraqis. Because the Pan-Arab leadership cannot 
be regarded as an integral part of the Iraqi ruling elite. 
4. Baram Amazis., The Ruling Political Elite in Ba'thi 
Iraq, 1968-86: The Changing Features of a 
Collective Profile (IJMES, 21(4); November 
1989, USA), p. 449. 
5. Of the Pan-Arab leadership elected on 11th Pan-Arab 
Congress of October 1977. Six member were 
Iraqis (Bakr, Husain, al-Duri Ramadan, Haddad 
and Aziz). Others were Michael Aflaq (Syria) 
Shibli al-Aysanni (Syria), Munif al-Razzaq 
(Jordan) Abd al-Majid (Lebanon), All Ghannam 
(Saudi Arabia) Qasim Salam (Yemen), Badr al-
Din (Sudan), see Baghdad Observer and JUMS,, 
10 October, 1977. 
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The next important Iraqi institution is the 
government which, according to the constitution, is 
appointed, dismissed, and supervised by the Chairman of the 
RCC. The government is responsible for carrying out RCC 
resolutions; it may also issue administrative instructions 
subject to RCC approval. It submits laws but does not 
enact them. Although the government is officially subordi-
nate to the RCC, and its prestige is not equal to that of 
the RL, it is of major importance as the highest purely 
executive institution in the country. 
Government ministers who do not belong to the RCC 
or the RL seem to contribute indirectly to policy-making on 
the national level simply by forming an integral part of 
the ruling elite. Whether they are party members (or very 
close to the party), or Kurdish nationalists, or commu-
nists, their views percolate to the top through their day-
to-day contacts with higher echelons, whether through 
friendly approval and encouragement or through opposition 
from within. 
However, under President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr the 
official orders used to be of political importance, and all 
the major political and economic decisions were indeed made 
in the RCC and the RL. 
Soon after the Ba'th Revolution of July 1968, two 
of the four officers who made the coup possible, colonel 
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Abdal-Rahman, Ibrahim al-Daud and Abdal-Razzaq al-Naif, 
were removed from power by the Ba'th Party. From July 30th 
Iraq was practically ruled by a small RCC group consisting 
of the General(s) Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr (who became a Field 
Marshal in 1969), Sabih Mahdi Ammash, Harden, Abdal-Ghaffar 
al-Takriti, Sadun Ghaydan and Hammad Shihab. This group 
was compact and monolithic; its members were all career 
officerswlth only a military education. Except for Hardan 
(lower class), they all came from the lower middle classes. 
Hov7ever, the 2i)d Ba'th regime of 1968 has been charac-
terized by the dominance of Tikritis, which arose chiefly 
because of substantial Tikriti representation in the army 
and other security forces at the time of the Ba'th coup of 
1968, and the tendency to recruit - one's own kith and kin, 
unlike the Baghdadis, who lost their prominence under the 
Ba'th, Tikritis have remained the most prominent regional 
group down to the present. 
At the Seventh Regional Party Congress of 24 
November 1968, Dr. Izzat Mustafa, one of Saddam Hussain's 
strongest opponents, was removed from the Regional 
Leadership. Out of three new members, the selected two, 
6. Baram Amazia., Op. cit., No. 4, p. 450. 
7. Ibid., p. 450. 
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nfmely Izzat Ibrahim al-Durl and Samir Abdal Aziz Nazam, 
were Saddam's supporters. All of them were civilian party 
workers and came from the lower classes. This is to 
clarify that the social background of the party worker also 
used to determine their respective power politics in the 
party. 
In November 1969, all RL members and all the Iraqis 
within the Party's Pan-Arab leadership joined the RCC. 
This, however, seemed like a power trade-off between the RL 
and Chairman Hasan al-Bakr, as it resulted in a substantial 
increase in the latter's powers, - the revised constitution 
of 1970 specified that the appointment and dismissal of 
deputies and ministers was the prerogative of the RCC 
Chairman, and that the President "may appoint himself 
premier" apparently at will. Only Harden and Ammash, 
Husain's most formidable opponents, were seriously affected 
by the changes in the 1969 RCC. 
A few months after the incorporation of the RL into 
the RCC, on April 3, 1970, they lost their posts as 
ministers of defense and interior, respectively (to be 
replaced by Shihab and Ghaydan), and as deputies of the 
prime minister, and made vice-presidents without any real 
authorities. Saddam Husain, then deputy secretary general 
of the RL, became in November 1969, deputy Chairman of the 
new RCC. 
Immediately after the merger of the two institu-
w 
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tions, Saddam Husain began to weed out his opponents. 
Shafiq al-Kamali and Abd Allah Sallum were quitely removed 
in March 1970. The differences between them and Saddam 
Husain were, in the first place, personal, but there were 
political differences as well. Both did much (as did Abdal 
Khaliq) to encourage Iraqi-Syrian Cooperation over the 
o 
Palestine issue. In this derive Abdal-Khaliq al-Samarra, a 
particularly staunch supporter of Iraqi-Syrian Cooperation, 
as sentenced to prison in July 1973, for alleged partici-
pation in the Kazzar coup; Izzat Mustafa was also removed 
in March 1977. Many others were also removed by various 
allegations. Due to these ongoing purges and the fact that 
no nev; members were being accepted, RCC membership dimi-
nished continuously until March 1977. By this time a well-
knit body of mere five members, viz. Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, 
Saddam Husain, Toha Yasin Ramadan, Izzat Ibrahim 'al-Duri) 
9 
and Saddam Ghoydan. 
In February 1977, the Shi' i in South of Iraq saw 
the most severe civil strife since Ba'th had come to power, 
and for the first time the media officially admitted Shi'i 
unrest. This traumatic event led to the appearance of 
Shi' i Arabs in the RCC although substantial Shi'i Arab 
penetration into the second most important institution, the 
RL, had begun in January 1977 before the riots in the South. 
The Shi'i Arabs in the Ba'th Party were now members 
8. Ibid., p. 452. 
9. Legum, Colin., Middle East Contemporary Survey, 
(Tel Aviv University, Vol. 1, 1976-77, p.409) 
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of the two highest political institution. Some of them 
held senior executive position and most had impressive 
executive records in both party and state Secretariat 
general of the party TANZIMAT''"*^  
Although, gradually Shi'i figures increased 
numerically in important positions of government in 
addition to their membership in the RCC and RL, the Sunni 
Arabs nevertheless retained their supermacy: the duties of 
President and Vice-President, Chairman and Deputy Chairman 
of the RCC, and Secretary General of the RL and his Deputy 
Commander of the popular Army, and the ministeries of 
defense all remained in sunni hands. A wide scale change 
had taken place in the structure after Saddam Husain came 
into power in the wake of the resignation of President Hasan 
al-Bakr on 16th July 1979. The members in the newly 
reconstitute' Vitri HCC and RL were again reduced in number >to 
sixteen from the previous twentytwo in RCC and fifteen from 
the twentyone RL members respectively. The percentage of 
Shi'i Arab also decreased slightly, but in terms of 
government portfolios and other executive positions, the 
balance between Shi'i and Sunni Arab improved in favour of 
the former. 
10. Tanjim (pi. Tanzimat) is the administrative unit 
immediately under the qulr (region) and its 
secretary generalship is the most senior 
executive position in the party. It generally 
means membership in the RL. 
11. Baram Amazia., Op. cit., No.4, p. 455. 
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In two respects the changes in the elite were also 
meaningful in ideological terms. As it happened, in both 
cases these changes narrowed the gap between the tradi-
tional doctrine of the Bia'th Party and its political 
practice. Incorporation of Shi'i into the highest party 
position and state echelons was seen as a step towards 
narrowing the very problematic gap between the party's Pan-
Arab theory and its practice in Iraq since 1968 and 
similarly in Syria in 1966. The correct interpretation of 
the Ba'th Party's nationalist credo is complete equality 
among all Arabic speaking people, and this is precisely how 
many young Shi'i who joined the party in the 1950s and who 
rose to great prominance in its ranks. Due to the great 
sensitivity of Sunni-Shi'i relations in Iraq (and similar 
to Sunni-Alawi relation in Syria), Party writings contain 
no explicit reference to the Shi'i's inferior position or 
to the need to rectify it. 
On the ideological-cultural level, this wish to 
intergrate the Shi'i (as well as other communities) into 
the Iraqi Political community is reflected in the new 
' mesopotamian' identity that was introduced into the 
pantheon of Iraqi Nationalism (Wataniyya) during the 1970s, 
1 Q 
chiefly by Saddam Husain and his circle. 
12. Ibid., p. 464. 
13. Baram Amatzia., 'Mesopotamian Identity in Ba'th 
Iraq' (Middle Eastern Studies October, 1983), 
p. 194. 
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As the most sensitive sphere is that of Sunni-Shi'i 
power-sharing, party and state publication treat this area 
with such extreme caution that even allusions to it are 
very rare. While it is true that, for its own good 
reasons, under the Republic, the Shi'i religious establish-
ment ceased to demand cabinet posts and administrative jobs 
for Shi'is, this was not the case with many secular-minded 
. .14 
Shi'i youngesters who were not interested in Sharii 
legislation but, rather, in government jobs, or Iraqi 
independence, or socialism, or Pan-Arabism, and thus joined 
the Ba'th, the Communist were inclined towards Nasirism. 
It v;as towards such secular minded people that Husain has 
aimed his coopting techniques in recent years. 
As for the ratio between civilians and army 
officers in the Party, Husain made it quite clear having 
learned its lession during the internal struggle between 
civilians and army officers in Syria between 1963 and 1966, 
that army officers shall enjoy no privileged status and 
should remain subordinate to the party. By the late 1980s, 
following a series of charges that started in the early 
1970s, Iraq came under the rule of new elite that, in 
certain respect, is unique in the history of the Iraqi 
Republic or the Iraqi Nation State. 
14, System based on Islamic sources, Quran and Hadith. 
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Since the late 1970s, cabinet ministers with well 
known record of nationalist (Iraqi of Pan-Arab) activity 
and with a degree of political independence who had been 
very prominent in the various republican regimes nealry 
disappeared, and their places were taken by young 
bureaucrats. The result is a government that is regimented 
in the extreme. The ruling elite of Iraq, under the Ba'th 
in the mid 1970s went through two other important changes: 
the penetration of Shi'i into the corridores of power and 
the diminishing influence of the army officers from the top 
political institutions. 
Inside Iraq the same logic of concentrating on 
local interests found expression in the acceleration of 
efforts on the part of the regime in order to forge a 
unified political community out of Iraq's diverse ethnic 
and denominational elements (chiefly Sunni and Shi'i Arabs) 
This was imperative if indeed the party intended to develop 
Iraq and to make it mighty and formidable. On the ideo-
logical level this was done through a large-scale, multi-
faceted campaign, launched in the early seventies, with the 
intention of giving all Iraqis a sense of belonging to one 
cultural, historical and even ethnic entity based on the 
history of the land of Iraq. This was particularly 
15. Baram Amatzia, Op. cit., No.A, p. 467. 
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important in view of Kurdish (and to an extent Shi' i) 
reservations regarding the geographically wider, Pan-Arab, 
alternative. It is with this last aim in mind that Saddam 
Husain instructed an educational committee assigned to 
1 f\ 
reform the school curriculum. 
When we talk of the (Arab) nation 
we should not forget to talk of the 
Iraqi people.... when we talk of 
the Arab homeland we should not 
neglect to educate the Iraqi to 
take price in this piece of land, 
the Iraqi region, in which he 
lives.... because this is his 
tangible homeland with which he 
interacts daily in a practical, 
specific way, while his interaction 
with the Arab homeland is a general 
one (based) on Principle. (This) 
means that we should not immerce 
ourselves in the fundamental Pan-
Arab and give up the I7attani„ the 
direct. In the same way we should 
not immerse ourselves in the 
direct, the watani, and stop 
talking of our Pan-Arab concepts, 
and the requirements of the 
struggle to achieve them. 
A very central part of this effort to strengthen 
Iraqidom (Wataniyya) was made by the regime, throughout the 
seventies and at least till mid 1982, through unearthing 
Iraq's ancient past. The regime encouraged all Iraqi 
Nationals to regard themselves as legitimate, cultural and 
16. i3aram, Aniatizia, 'Qawmiyya and Wataniyya in Ba'thi 
Iraq, The Search for a New Balance (Middle 
East Survey, 19(2) April 1983), p. 195. 
17. Ibid., p. 195.' 
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at times, ethnic heirs to the great civilizations that 
flourished in 'the land between the two rivers'. At the 
same time, there was no intention to detach Iraq from the 
Arab Nation. Rather, it was Iraqi uniqueness, and some-
times even seniority within the Arab family which was being 
emphasized. This was a major change in traditional Ba'th 
doctrine which is essentially intergrative and egalitarian. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the final analysis the Political History of the 
Ba'th Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM) may be divided into 
various interrelated but distinct phases. The first-
extended from the Palestine War in 1948 to the early days 
of the temporary establishment of Arab Union of the Syria, 
Iraq and Egypt. During this period the political outlook 
of the Movement was largely governed by its intense and 
determined concern for Palestine. Its efforts on both the 
regional and Pan-Arab levels were dominated by its unshak-
able belief in Arab Unity as the inevitable path for the 
liberation of the Arab World from Zionism and western 
imperialism. The majority of its members and followers at 
this stage were drawn from among the students and intellec-
tuals from a number of Arab countries. They thought of 
themselves as the vanguard of a national movement, whose 
task was to mobilize the whole Arab Nation in its struggle 
for Arab Unity and Freedom from all forms of foreign 
dominations, with no regard to political boundaries, 
religious differences, or social conflicts. 
During 1958-68, the unifiers of Arab Nationalist 
Movement pinned their hopes to United Arab Republic (UAR) and 
Nasir's leadership for the realization of Arab National 
alms at the expense of its own ideological and organi-
zational independence. However, parallel to this was the 
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Movement's growing awareness of the importance of the 
socio-economic factor in determining the conditions of 
political transformation. This tendency was reinforced by 
Syria's secession from the UAR in 1961. It was thus recog-
nised that to speak of the Arab Nation as a unified whole 
was a kind of idealism which did not correspond to the 
realities of the existing political and social situation in 
the Arab World. This, however, ultimately resulted in its 
disintegration into decentralized regional groups and 
factions. 
The next phase witnessed the intensification of the 
ideological conflict within the Movement and the eventual 
consolidation of the organizational, political and ideolo-
gical independence of its branches, thus ending for, its 
existence all practical purposes as a Pan-Arab Organisation, 
The Ba'th Movement of Arab Nationalism at this 
juncture adopted two distinct characteristics In the Arab 
East: an increasing tendency to become more exclusive and 
radical, and a growing inclination to abandon its Pan-
Arabism in favour of a regionally oriented strategy. 
Throughout the 1950s, the Ba'th conceived the idea of the 
Arab Nation as an organic whole entrusted with the task of 
national regeneration. However, with the failure of the 
Arabs first experiment In unity in 1961, and their defeat 
as a united force in 1967 Arab-Israel War, the Ba'th 
conception of the nature and role of the Arab Nation 
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suffered a great deal. In the first instance, the Ba'th 
accused the 'Arab Leadership' of conspiring against any 
form of union among the Arab countries, while on the second 
occasion it blamed the 'petty bourgeoise leadership' of the 
Arabs headed by the UAR for this disastrous defeat. 
In a pragmatic fashion, the Ba'th Movement realized 
that a decisive change in the status quo of the Arab 
countries was not likely to occur in the foreseeable future 
unless it was accompanied by a process of regional trans-
formation. The key to Arab regeneration in the form of a 
unified socialist state was not to be found in an idealis-
tic attempt to harmonize the efforts of conflicting 
political systems and social interests, but lay in first 
preparing the social and political conditions in each Arab 
country for such an eventuality. 
While unable to achieve an absolute measure of 
political stability, Ba'th managed, nevertheless, to 
generate sufficient support internally to maintain their 
own separate existence. In the post 1967 war period, the 
advocates of Ba'th Ideology eventually realized the imprac-
ticability of a comprehensive Arab Movement under the 
unstable political conditions in the Arab World. Conse-
quently, its Pan-Arab character gave way to an increasing 
tendency to participate in regional politics. The new 
Ba'thist governments were more successful in accommodating 
by compromise and more often by coercion the political 
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ambitions and economic interests of the more influential 
segments of society, such as the landed gentry, royal 
families and more recently army officers and bureaucrats 
generating the feeling of Wataniyya over Qaumiyya. Conse-
quently the call to abolish boundaries between Arab States, 
and the demand to eradicate social and economic differences 
were fiercely countered by the adamant resistance of those 
who had vested interests in preserving the state of 
political fragmentation in the Arab World. Today the 
conflict between the Ba'th Government in Syria and Iraq 
cannot be entirely attributed to ideological differences. 
Underlying this conflict are the concrete state interests 
of the two countries, in diiclmo amount of rhetoric on Arab 
Unity and brotherhood can dispel. 
An additional factor which militated against any 
effective form of Arab integration and hampered its unity 
in the lates half of the present century was the economic 
and political disparity among the Arab countries. The Arab 
Unity has been further weakened by the reliance of the Arab 
States on the great powers for military and political 
support. The growing involvement of the super powers in 
the area since the mid-fifties heightened the state of 
political tension among the Arab regimes. 
Within this context, the role played by the Arab 
Nationalist Movement to bring about desired political and 
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social change has been less impressive than the one 
performed by Nasir and Ba'th. More important however, and 
unlike their traditional predecessors, they often managed 
to bring the Arab masses temporarily into the arena of 
political struggle but unfortunately without sustaining 
this involvement in an organised and structured form. With 
the few exceptions, the Ba'th Arab Nationalist Movement 
failed to capture political power in any other Arab 
country. 
Hence, the evolution of the modern movement of Arab 
Nationalism from the mid-forties onwards has been the 
result of political incompetence of their traditional 
rulers. The difficulties and weaknesses of Ba'th Movement 
cannot be simply enumerated and asserted. However, in order 
to highlight its qualities, one must realize that Arabs 
have experienced a political revolution under Ba'th 
Nationalism, i.e. a fundamental change that produced a new 
principle of authority, political organization and style 
of political life. 
Thus to sum up without considering the Intricacies, 
the Ba'th Movement as a centrally organised political party 
ceased to exist after 1968 has remained an important factor 
in the evolution of revolutionary regional movements 
seeking to alter the social and political structure of the 
contemporary Arab World. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE BA'TH PARTY 
ADOPTED IN APRIL 1947 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
First Principles: Unity and Freedom of the Arab Nation 
The ARABS form one nation. This nation has 
the natural right to live in a single state 
and to be free to direct its own destiny. 
The Party of the Arab Ba'th therefore 
believes that : 
(1) The Arab fatherland constitutes an indi-
visible political and economic unity. No 
Arab country can live apart from the 
others . 
(2) The Arab nation constitutes a cultural 
unity. Any differences existing among 
its sons are accidental and unimportant. 
They will all disappear with the awaken-
ing of the Arab consciousness. 
(3) The Arab fatherland belongs to the Arabs. 
They alone have the right to administer 
its affairs, to dispose of its wealth, 
and to direct its destinies. 
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Second Principle: Personality of the Arab Nation 
The Arab nation is characterized by virtues 
which are the result of its successive 
rebirths. These virtues are characterized by 
vitality and creativeness and by an ability 
for transformation and renewal. Its renewal 
is always linked to growth in personal 
freedom, and harmony between its evolution 
and the national interest. 
The Party of the Arab Ba'th therefore 
believes that: 
(1) Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, 
freedom of belief, as well as artistic 
freedom, are sacred. No authority can 
diminish them. 
(2) The value of the citizens is measured 
once all opportunities have been given 
them by the action they take to further 
the progress and prosperity of the Arab 
nation, without regard to any other 
criterion. 
Third Principle: The Mission of the Arab Nation 
The Arab nation has an eternal mission. This 
mission reveals itself in ever new and 
related forms through the different stages of 
history. It aims at the renewal of human 
values, at the quickening of human progress, 
at increasing harmony and mutual help among 
the nations. 
The Party of the Arab Ba'th therefore 
believes that: 
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(1) Colonialism and all that goes with it is 
a criminal enterprise. The Arabs must 
fight it with all possible means, just as 
they must take it on themselves to help, 
according to their physical and moral 
abilities, all peoples fighting for their 
freedom. 
(2) Humanity constitutes a whole, the 
interests of which are solidary and the 
values and civilization of which are 
common to all. The Arabs are enriched by 
world civilization and enrich it in their 
turn. They stretch a fraternal hand to 
other nations and collaborate with them 
for the establishment of just insti-
tutions which will ensure for all the 
peoples prosperity and peace, as well as 
moral and spiritual advance. 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
ARTICLE 1 The Party of the "Arab Ba'th" is a universal 
Arab Party. It has branches in all the Arab 
countries. It does not concern itself with 
regional politics except in relation to the 
higher interests of the Arab cause. 
ARTICLE 2 The headquarters of the party is for the tirrn 
being located in Damascus. It can be trans-
ferred to any other Arab city if the national 
interest should require it. 
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ARTICLE 3 The Party of the Arab Ba'th is a national 
party. It believes that nationalism is a 
living and eternal reality. It believes that 
the feeling of national awakening which 
intimately unites the individual to his 
nation is a sacred feeling. This feeling has 
within itself a potential of creative power 
it binds itself to sacrifice, it seeks the 
exercise of responsibilities, and it directs 
the individual personality in a concrete and 
active manner. 
The national idea to which the party 
appeals is the will of the Arab people to 
free themselves and to unite. It demands 
that the opportunity be given to it to 
realize in history its Arab personality, and 
to collaborate with all the nations in all 
the fields which will ensure the march of 
humanity toward welfare and progress. 
ARTICLE 4 The Party of the Arab Ba'th is a socialist 
party. It believes that socialism is a 
necessity which emanates from the depth of 
Arab nationalism itself. Socialism 
constitutes, in fact, the ideal social order 
which will allow the Arab people to realize 
its possibilities and to enable its genius to 
flourish, and which will ensure for the 
nation constant progress in its material and 
moral output. It makes possible a trustful 
brotherhood among its members. 
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ARTICLE 5 The Party of the Arab Ba' th is a popular 
party. It believes that sovereignty is the 
property of the people, who alone is the 
source of all authority. It believes that 
the value of the state is the outcome of the 
will of the masses from which it issues and 
that this value is sacred only to the extent 
that the masses have exercised their choice 
freely. That is why, in the accomplishment 
of its mission, the party relies on the 
people with whom it seeks to establish 
intricate contact, the spiritual, moral, 
material, and physical level of whom it is 
trying to raise, in order that the people may 
become conscious of its personality and that 
it may become able to exercise its right in 
private and public life. 
ARTICLE 6 The Party of the Arab Ba'th is revolutionary. 
It believes that its main objectives for the 
realization of the renaissance of Arab 
nationalism or for the establishment of 
socialism cannot be achieved except by means 
of revolution and struggle. To rely on slow 
evolution and to be satisfied with a partial 
and superficial reform is to threaten these 
aims and to conduce to their failure and 
their loss. 
Thi^ s is why the party decides in favor of : 
(1' The struggle against foreign colonialism, 
in order to liberate the Arab fatherland 
completely and finally. 
(2) The struggle to gather all the Arabs in a 
single independent state 
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(3) The overthrow of the present faulty 
structure, an overthrow which will 
include all the sectors of intellectual, 
economic, social, and political life. 
ARTICLE 7 The Arab fatherland is that part of the globe 
inhabited by the Arab nation which stretches 
from the Taurus Mountain, the Pocht i-Kouh 
Mountains, the Gulf of Basra, the Arab Ocean, 
the Ethiopian Mountains, the Sahara, the 
Atlantic Ocean, and the Mediterranean. 
ARTICLE 8 The official language of the state, as well 
as that of all the citizens, is Arabic. It 
alone is recognized in correspondence and in 
teaching. 
ARTICLE 9 The emblem of the Arab state is that of the 
Arab revolution begun in 1916 to liberate and 
unify the Arab nation. 
ARTICLE 10 An Arab is he whose language is Arabic, who 
has lived on Arab soil or who, after having 
been assimilated to Arab life, has faith in 
his belonging to the Arab nation. 
ARTICLE 11 To be excluded from the Arab fatherland: who 
ever has fought for or has belonged to a 
factious anti Arab association, whoever has 
lent himself inside the Arab fatherland to 
colonial ends. 
ARTICLE 12 
'^ n <^ 
ACC No. ^X^ 
The Arab woman enjoys all ^ ^tkis—=fxghts of 
citizenship. The party struggles to raise up 
women's level in order to make her fit to 
exercise these rights. 
ARTICLE 13 The party strives to give all the citizens 
the same opportunities in the field of 
schooling and livelihood in order that, in 
the various aspects of human activity, every 
one should be equally able to show his real 
abilities and to develop them to the maximum. 
THE WAY: INTERNAL POLICY OF THE PARTY 
ARTICLE 14 The regime of the Arab state will be a 
constitutional parliamentary regime. 
Executive pov;er is responsible before the 
legislative, which is directly elected by the 
people. 
ARTICLE 15 The national tie is the only tie that may 
exist in the Arab state. It ensures harmony 
among all the citizens by melting them in the 
crucible of a single nation and counteracts 
all religious, communal, tribal, racial, or 
regional factions. 
ARTICLE 16 The administrative system of the Arab state 
is a system of decentralization. 
ARTICLE 17 The party strives to make popular feeling 
universal and to make the power of the people 
a living reality in the life of the 
individual. It undertakes to give the state a 
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constitution guaranteeing to all Arab 
citizens absolute equality before the law, 
the right to express their opinions in 
absolute freedom, and a true choice of their 
representatives, thus ensuring for them a 
free life within the framework of the law. 
ARTICLE 18 A single code of laws is to be established 
freely for the whole of the Arab nation. 
This code will be in conformity with the 
spirit of the times and will take into 
account the past experiences of the Arab 
nation. 
ARTICLE 19 The judicial power will be independent. It 
will be free from interference by other 
powers and enjoy total immunity. 
ARTICLE 20 The rights of citizenship are granted in 
their totality to every citizen living on 
Arab soil who is devoted to the Arab father-
land and who has no connection with any 
factious association. 
ARTICLE 21 Military service is compulsory in the Arab 
fatherland. 
FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PARTY 
ARTICLE 22 The foreign policy of the Arab state will be 
guided by the interests of Arab nationalism 
and of the eternal mission of the Arabs which 
seeks to establish in cooperation with other 
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nations a free, harmonious, and secure world, 
continuously advancing in progress. 
ARTICLE 23 The Arabs will struggle with all their power 
to destroy the foundations of colonialism and 
of foreign occupation and to suppress all 
foreign political or economic influence in 
their country. 
ARTICLE 24 Since the Arab people is the sole source of 
power, all treaties, pacts, and documents 
concluded by governments which detract from 
the total sovereignty of the Arabs will be 
abrogated. 
ARTICLE 25 Arab foreign policy seeks to give a true 
picture of the will of the Arabs to live in 
freedom, and of their sincere desire to see 
all other nations enjoy the same liberty. 
ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE PARTY 
ARTICLE 26 The Party of the Arab Ba'th is a socialist 
party. It believes that the economic wealth 
of the fatherland belongs to the nation. 
ARTICLE 27 The present distribution of wealth in the 
Arab fatherland is unjust.- Therefore, a 
review and a just redistribution will become 
necessary. 
ARTICLE 28 The equality of all the citizens is founded 
on human values. This is why the party 
forbids the exploitation of the work of 
others. 
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ARTICLE 29 Public utilities, extensive natural 
resources, big industry, and the means of 
transport are the property of the nation. 
The state will manage them directly and will 
abolish private companies and foreign 
concessions. 
ARTICLE 30 Ownership of agricultural land will be so 
limited as to be in proportion to the means 
of the proprietor to exploit all his lands 
without exploitation of the efforts of 
others. This will be under the control of 
the state and in conformity with its overfall 
economic plan. 
ARTICLE 31 Small industrial ownership will be so limited 
as to be related to the standard of living of 
the citizens of the state as a whole. 
ARTICLE 32 Workers will participate in the management of 
their factory. In addition to their wages 
fixed by the state they will receive a 
proportion of the profits,, also fixed by the 
state. 
ARTICLE 33 Ownership of immovable property is allowed to 
all the citizens so long as they do not 
exploit it to the harm of others, and so long 
as the state ensures for all citizens a 
minimum of immovable property. 
ARTICLE 34 Property and inheritance are two natural 
rights. They are protected within the limits 
of the national interest. 
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ARTICLE 35 Usurious loans are prohibited between 
citizens. One state bank is to be founded to 
issue currency, which the national output 
will back. This bank will finance the vital 
agricultural and industrial plans of the 
nation. 
ARTICLE 36 The state will control directly internal and 
external trade in order to abolish the 
exploitation of the consumer by the producer. 
The state will protect them both, as it will 
protect the national output against the 
competition of foreign foods and will ensure 
equilibrium between exports and imports. 
ARTICLE 37 General planning, inspired by the most modern 
economic ideas, will be organized so that the 
Arab fatherland will be industrialized, 
national production developed, new outlets 
opened for it, and the industrial economy of 
each region directed according to its 
potential and to the raw material it 
contains. 
SOCIAL POLICY OF THE PARTY 
ARTICLE 38 Family, Procreation, Marriage, 
>1) The family is the basic cell of the 
nation. It is for the state to protect, 
to develop, and to help it. 
2^) Procreation is a trust given in the first 
place to the family and then to the 
state. Both must ensure its increase, 
and look to the health and education of 
the descendants. 
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(3) Marriage is a national duty. The state 
must encourage it, facilitate it, and 
control it. 
ARTICLE 39 Public Health, 
The state will build, as its expense, insti-
tutions of preventive medicine, dispensaries, 
and hospitals which will meet the needs of 
all citizens, for v;hom the state ensures free 
medical treatment. 
ARTICLE 40 Labor. 
§1) Labor is an obligation for all those who 
are capble of it. It is for the state to 
ensure that work is available to every 
citizen, whether intellectual or manual. 
§2) The employer must ensure at the least a 
decent standard of living for his 
employee. 
§3) The state sees to the maintenance of all 
persons incapable of work. 
§4) Just laws will be promulgated to limit 
the workman's daily hours of work, to 
give him the right to paid weekly and 
annual holidays, to protect the rights, 
to ensure social security for him in old 
age, and to indemnify him for any 
cessation of v-jork, whether partial or 
total. 
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§5) Free workman's and peasants' unions will 
be established and encouraged, so that 
they may constitute an instrument 
efficient in the defense of their rights, 
in raising their standard of living, in 
developing their abilities, in increasing 
the opportunities offered to them, in 
creating among them a spirit of solida-
rity, and in representing them in joint 
works councils. 
§6) Joint works councils will be created in 
which the state and the unions of workmen 
and peasants will be represented. These 
councils will have power to decide the 
issues arising among the unions, the 
works managers, and the representatives 
of the state. 
ARTICLE 41 Culture and Society 
§1) The party seeks to develop a general 
national culture for the whole Arab 
fatherland which shall be Arab, liberal, 
progressive, extensive, profound, and 
humanist; it attempts to disseminate it 
in all sections of the population. 
§2) The state is responsible for the protec-
tion of the liberty of speech, of publi-
cation, of assembly, of protest, and of 
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the press, within the limits of the 
higher Arab national interest. It is for 
the state to facilitate all the means and 
the modalities which tend to realize this 
liberty. 
J3) Intellectual work is one of the most 
sacred kinds. It is the state's concern 
to protect and encourage intellectuals 
and scientists. 
>4) Within the limist of the Arab national 
idea, every freedom wil be given for the 
foundation of clubs, associations, 
parties, youth groupings, and tourist 
organizations, as well as for obtaining 
profit from the cinema, radio, tele-
vision, and all the other facilities of 
modern civilization in order to spread 
generally the national culture, and to 
contribute to the entertainment of the 
people. 
ARTICLE 42 Separation of the classes and differentiation 
among them are abolished. The separation of 
the classes is the consequence of a faulty 
social order. Therefore, the party carries 
on its struggle among the laboring ad 
oppressed classes of society so that such 
separation and differentiation will come to 
an end and the citizens will recover the 
whole of their human dignity and will be 
enabled to live in the shadow of a just 
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social order in which nothing will disting 
uish one citizen from another except 
intellectual capacity and manual skill. 
ARTICLE 43 Nomadism. Nomadism is a primitive social 
state. It decreases the national output and 
makes an important part of the nation a 
paralyzed member and an obstacle to its 
development and progress. The party struggles 
for the sedentarization of nomads by the 
grant of lands to them, for the abolition of 
tribal customs, and for the application to 
the nomads of the laws of the state. 
POLICY OF THE PARTY IN EDUCATION AND TEACHING 
The educational policy of the party aims at 
the creation of a new Arab generation which 
believes in the unity of the nation, and in 
the eternity of its mission. This policy, 
based on scientific reasoning, will be freed 
from the shackles of superstitions and 
reactionary traditions it will be imbued 
with the spirit of optimism, of struggle, and 
of solidarity among all citizens in the 
carrying out of a total Arab revolution, and 
in the cause of human progress. 
Therefore the party decides as follows: 
ARTICLE 44 A national Arab stamp will mark all the 
aspects of intellectual, economic, political, 
architectual, and aristic life. The party 
establishes once again the links of the Arab 
nation with its glorious history and urges it 
toward a future even more glorious and more 
exemplary. 
86 
ARTICLE 45 Teaching is one of the exclusive functions of 
the state. Therefore, all foreign and 
private educational institutions are 
abolished. 
ARTICLE 46 Education at all stages shall be free for all 
citizens. Primary and secondary education 
shall be compulsory. 
ARTICLE 47 Professional schools with the most modern 
equipment shall be established, where 
education shall be free. 
ARTICLE 48 Teaching careers and all that relates to 
education are set aside for Arab citizens. 
An exception to this rule is made in the 
instance of higher education. 
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 
SINGLE ARTICLE The fundamental and general principles of 
the Constitution cannot be amended. 
Other articles may, however, be amended, 
provided that two- thirds of the General 
Council of the party agree thereto, on a 
motion put by the Executive Council, or 
by a quarter of the members of the 
General Council, or by ten members of the 
Party Organization. 
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APPENDIX - B 
THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION 
PART ONE 
THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ 
ARTICLE 1 Iraq is a Sovereign People's Democratic 
Republic: its principal aim is to achieve 
the United Arab State and establish the 
Socialist System. 
ARTICLE 2 The People is the source of authority and 
its legitimacy. 
ARTICLE 3 (a) Sovereignty of Iraq is an indivisible 
unit. 
(b) The land of Iraq is an indivisible unit 
and no part of it shall be relinquished 
ARTICLE 4 
ARTICLE 5 
Islam is the religion of the State. 
(a) Iraq is part of the Arab Nation. 
(b) The People of Iraq is formed of two 
principal nationalities, the Arab 
nationality and the Kurdish nationality 
This Constitution shall recognize the 
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national rights of the Kurdish People 
and the legitimate rights of all mino-
rities within the unity of Iraq. 
ARTICLE 6 The Iraqi nationality and its rulings shall be 
determined by the law. 
ARTICLE 7 (a) Arabic is the official language. 
(b) The Kurdish language, in addition to 
the Arabic language, shall be the 
official language in the Kurdish Region 
ARTICLE 8 (a) Baghdad is the Capital of the Republic 
of Iraq, and it may be shifted by a law 
(b) The Republic of Iraq shall be divided 
into administrative units which shall 
be organised on the basis of decentra-
lization. 
(c) The area whose majority of population 
is from Kurds shall enjoy autonomy in 
accordance with what is defined by the 
law. 
ARTICLE 9 The Flag and the Emblem of the Republic of 
Iraq and the rules pertaining to them shall 
be specified by a law. 
PART TWO 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BASES OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ 
ARTICLE 10 Social solidarity is the foremost foundation 
for society. Its implication is that every 
citizen shall perform fully his duty towards 
society and that society shall ensure to the 
citizen his full rights and freedoms. 
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ARTICLE 11 The family is the nucleus of society. The 
State shall guarantee its protection and 
support, and shall foster maternity and 
childhood. 
ARTICLE 12 The State shall undertake planning, 
directing and guiding the national economy 
in accordance with the following aims: 
(a) Establishing the socialist system on 
scientific and revolutionary principles 
(b) Achieving Arab economic unity. 
ARTICLE 13 National resources and fundamental instru-
ments of production are the property of the 
People, and the central authority of the 
Republic of Iraq shall employ them directly 
In accordance with the requirements of the 
general planning of the national economy. 
ARTICLE 14 The State shall ensure, promote and support 
all kinds of cooperation in production, 
distribution and consumption. 
ARTICLE 15 Public properties and the properties of the 
public sector shall have special inviolabi-
lity, which the State and all citizens have 
to maintain and guarantee their security and 
promotion. Any subversion or attack on it 
shall be regarded as an attack on the 
structure of society and a violence to it. 
ARTICLE 16 (a) Ownership is a social function which 
shall be exercised within the limits of 
society's aims and the State's pro-
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grammes in accordance with the 
provisions of the law. 
(b) Private ownership and individual econo-
mic freedom shall be guaranteed within 
the limits of the law provided that 
individual ownership will not contra-
dict or be detrimental to general eco-
nomic planning. 
(c) Private property shall not be expro-
priated except for the public interest 
and in accordance with just compensa-
tion in accordance with the provisions 
of the law. 
(d) The maximum agricultural ownership 
shall be defined by the law and the 
excess shall be regarded as the 
property of the People. 
ARTICLE 17 Inheritance is a recognized right regulated 
by a law. 
ARTICLE 18 Real estate ownership is forbidden to non-
Iraqis except in cases specified by a law. 
ARTICLE 19 
PART THREE 
BASIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
(a) All citizens are equal before the law, 
without distinction on the basis of 
race, , origin, language, class or 
religion. 
(b) Equal opportunities for all citizens 
shall be guaranteed within the limits 
of the law. 
91 
ARTICLE 20 (a) The accused Is innocent until he is 
declared guilty by judicial procedure. 
(b) The right to defense is sacred in all 
processes of investigation and trial in 
accordance with the provisions of the 
law. 
(c) All trials shall be open to the public 
unless declared in camera. 
ARTICLE 21 (a) Penalty is personal. 
(b) There shall be no offence or penalty 
except as defined by a law. No penalty 
shall be imposed except on an act 
deemed by the law as an offence at the 
time of its commission. No more severe 
penalty than the penalty enforced at 
the time of committing the offence 
shall be applied. 
ARTICLE 22 (a) The dignity of Man is guaranteed. Any 
kind of physical or psychological 
torture shall be prohibited. 
(b) No one may be arrested, detained, 
imprisoned or searched except in accor-
dance with the provisions of the law. 
(c) Homes are inviolable. They may not be 
entered or searched except as specified 
by the law. 
ARTICLE 23 Privacy of mail, telegraphic and telephone 
correspondence shall be guaranteed, and it 
shall not be violated except for reasons of 
public security in accordance with the 
limits and the rules provided by the law. 
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ARTICLE 24 No citizen shall be prevented from travel 
outside the country or from returning there-
to and no restriction shall be imposed on 
his moving and residence inside Che country 
except in the case defined by the law. 
ARTICLE 25 Freedom of religion, beliefs and exercise of 
religious ceremonies shall be guaranteed, 
provided that this freedom shall neither 
contradict the provisions of the Consti-
tution and the law nor violate morality and 
public order. 
ARTICLE 26 The Constitution shall guarantee freedom of 
opinion, publication, meeting,demonstration, 
forming of political parties, unions and 
societies in accordance with the aims of the 
Constitution and within the limits of the 
law. The State shall endeavour to provide 
the means required for exercising these 
freedoms, which run in line with the 
nationalist and progressive line of the 
Revolution. 
ARTICLE 27 (a) The State shall undertake to eliminate 
illiteracy and ensure the right of 
free-of-charge education in various 
elementary, secondary and university 
levels to all citizens. 
(b) The State shall endeavour to make ele-
mentary education compulsory, expand 
vocational and technical education in 
all towns and villages and particularly 
promote evening education which enables 
the popular masses to correlate 
knowledge between science and labour. 
93 
(c) The State shall guarantee freedom of 
scientific research, promote and reward 
distinction and creativity in all 
intellectual, scientific and technical 
activities and all kinds of popular 
genius. 
ARTICLE 28 Education shall aim at raising and develop-
ing the general cultural level, developing 
the scientific thinking, encouraging the 
spirit of research, fulfilling the require-
ments of economic and social development 
programmes, creating a free nationalist and 
progressive generation solid in structure 
and character, which takes pride in its 
people, its homeland and its legacy, sympa-
thizes with the rights of all its nationa-
lities and opposes the doctrines of capita-
lism, exploitation, reaction, Zionism and 
colonialism in order to achieve Arab unity, 
freedom and socialism. 
ARTICLE 29 The State shall endeavour to provide the 
means of enjoying the achievements of modern 
civilization for the masses of the people 
and generalize the progressive outputs of 
modern civilization to all citizens. 
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ARTICLE 30 (a) Public office is a sacred trust and a 
social service, whose principal 
attribute is a loyal obligation to 
protect the interests of the masses, 
their rights and freedoms in accordance 
with the provisions of the Constitu-
tion and the law. 
(b) Equality of employment in public office 
shall be guaranteed by the law. 
ARTICLE 3 1 (a) Defense of the homeland is a sacred 
duty and an honour bestowed to the 
citizen. Service to the Flag is 
compulsory and the law shall organize 
the manner of its performance. 
ib) The Armed Forces are the property of 
the people, and they are the People's 
tool for preserving its security, 
defending its independence, protecting 
the people's and the homeland's safety 
and unity and achieving its national 
and patriotic aims and aspirations. 
(c) The State alone shall undertake to 
establish Armed Forces, and nobody or 
group shall be entitled to establish 
military or para-military formations. 
ARTICLE 32 (a) Work is a right which the State shall 
undertake to provide to every citizen 
capable of it. 
(b) Work is an honour and a sacred duty 
imposed on every capable citizen. It 
is required by the necessity of parti-
cipation in building society and its 
protection, development and prosperity. 
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(d) The State shall undertake to provide 
wider social ensurances for all 
citizens in case of sickness, disabi-
lity, unemployment and old age. 
(e) The State shall endeavour to organize 
the programme and ensure the necessary 
means which enable working citizens to 
spend their leaves in an atmosphere 
that helps them to improve their health 
standards and develop their cultural 
and technical gifts. 
ARTICLE 33 The State shall undertake to protect public 
health through continuous expansion of free-
of-charge medical services, whether by 
prevention, treatment or medicine, in all 
cities, towns and villages. 
ARTICLE 34 (a) The Republic of Iraq shall grant poli-
tical asylum to all persons persecuted 
in their countries because of their 
struggle in the defense of human libe-
ration principles, which the Iraqi has 
accepted under this Constitution. 
(b) Political refugees shall not be 
delivered. 
ARTICLE 35 Payment of taxes is a duty imposed on all 
citizens. Taxes may not be imposed, amended 
or levied except by a law. 
ARTICLE 36 Any activity which contradicts the aims of 
the people defined in this Constitution and 
any act of conduct aiming at undermining the 
national unity of the masses of the people. 
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provoking racial or sectarian or regional 
bigotry among their ranks, or violating 
their progressive gains and achievements, 
shall be prohibited. 
PART FOUR 
THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL 
ARTICLE 37 The Revolutionary Command Council is the 
supreme body in the State, which has under-
taken since the 17th of July, 1968, the 
responsibility of achieving the people's 
public will by stripping power from the 
reactionary, dictatorial, corrupt system and 
restoring it to the people. 
ARTICLE 38 The Revolutionary Command Council shall 
exercise, by a majority of two thirds of its 
members, the following powers: 
(a) Elect the Chairman from among its 
members^ who shall be designated as the 
Chairman of the Revolutionary Command 
Council and President of the Republic. 
(b) Elect the Vice Chairman from among its 
members who shall be designated as Vice 
Chairman of the Revolutionary Command 
Council and take the place of the 
Chairman in case of his official 
absence or his exercise of his consti-
tutional powers becomes difficult or 
impossible for any legal reason. 
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(c) Select new members to the Council from 
among the Regional Command of the Arab 
Ba'th Socialist Party, provided that 
its members shall not exceed twelve. 
(d) Accept the resignation of the Chairman 
or the Vice Chairman or any of the 
Council's members. 
(e) Release any of its members from member-
ship of the Council. 
(f) Charge and send to trial any members of 
the Revolutionary Command Council, or 
any deputy of the President of the 
Republic or any Ministers. 
ARTICLE 39 The Chairman, the Vice Chairman and the 
Members of the Revolutionary Command Council 
shall take the following oath before the 
Council: 
"I swear by Almighty God, by my honour 
and belief to preserve the Republican Regime 
and abide by its Constitution and laws, 
protect the people's interests, safeguard 
the homeland's independence and safety and 
integrity of its lands and endeavor with 
full sacrifice and loyalty to fulfil the 
Arab Nation's aims of unity, freedom and 
socialism." 
ARTICLE 40 The Chairman, the Vice Chairman and the 
Members of the Revolutionary Command Council 
shall enjoy full immunity and no measure may 
be taken against anyone of them except by 
prior permission from the Council. 
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ARTICLE 41 (a) The Revolutionary Command Council shall 
convene at the invitation of its 
Chairman or Vice Chairman or one third 
of its members. Its sessions shall be 
convened under the presidency of the 
Chairman or the Vice Chairman and the 
presence of the majority of its 
(b) Meetings and discussions of the Revolu-
tionary Command Council are in camera; 
their disclosure shall be subject to 
constitutional inquiry before the 
Council. Announcement, publication and 
notification of the decisions of the 
Council shall be performed by the 
manners provided in this Constitution. 
(c) Laws and resolutions shall be approved 
in the Council by the majority of its 
members, except in the case otherwise 
provided in this Constitution. 
ARTICLE 42 The Revolutionary Command Council shall 
exercise the following powers: 
(a) Promulgate laws and decrees which have 
the power of the law. 
(b) Issue decrees required by the necessi-
ties of applying the provisions of the 
enforced laws. 
ARTICLE 43 The Revolutionary Command Council shall 
exercise, by the majority of its members, 
the following powers: 
(a) Approve recommendations of the Ministry 
of Defense and public security, 
initiate laws and adopt resolutions 
concerning them in respect to organi-
zation and jurisdictions. 
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(b) Declare general mobilization partially 
or fully, declare war, accept armistice 
and conclude peace. 
(c) Approve the draft of the general budget 
of the State and the independent and 
investment budgets annexed thereto and 
the credit of the final accounts. 
(d) Ratify international treaties and 
agreements. 
(e) Provide the internal regulations of the 
Council, define its cadre, approve its 
budget, appoint its officials and 
specify remunerations and allowances of 
the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, the 
members and the officials. 
(f) Lay down the rules for the trial of its 
members and setting up the court and 
the procedures which must be followed. 
(g) Authorize its Chairman or the Vice 
Chairman to exercise some of its powers 
provided in this Constitution except 
legislative powers. 
ARTICLE 44 The Chairman of the Revolutionary Command 
Council shall undertake the following: 
(a) Preside over the meetings of the 
Council, represent it, conduct its 
sessions and order expenditure therein. 
(b) Sign all laws and resolutions promul-
gated by the Council and their publication 
in the Official Gazette. 
(c) Supervise the works of the Ministers 
and Institutions of the State, call the 
u'inisters for conferring on the affairs 
of their Ministries, interrogate them 
when necessary and inform the Revolu-
tionary Command Council thereof. 
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ARTICLE 45 Each of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman and 
and Members of the Revolutionary Command 
Council shall be responsible before the 
Council for violating the Constitution, for 
violating the obligations of the Constitu-
tional oath or for any act or conduct which 
the Council deems as detrimental to the 
honour of responsibility which he exercises. 
ARTICLE 46 A Higher Financial Comptrolling Authority 
shall be established and attached to the 
Revolutionary Command Council. Its head and 
the rules of its functions shall be regu-
lated by a law. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
ARTICLE 47 The National Assembly shall consist of the 
representatives of the people in all its 
political, economic and social sectors. Its 
formation, manner of membership, process of 
work in it and its powers shall be defined 
by a special law, namely, the National 
Assembly Law. 
ARTICLE 48 The National Assembly must meet in two ordi-
nary sessions each year. The Chairman of the 
Revolutionary Command Council is entitled to 
call the Assembly for an extra-ordinary 
meetings whenever required, and the meeting 
shall be confined to the subjects for which 
it is called. Sessions of the National 
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Assembly shall be convened and concluded by 
a resolution issued by the Revolutionary 
Command Council. 
ARTICLE 49 Sessions of the Assembly shall be conducted 
publicly unless it is decided to convene 
some of them in camera in accordance with 
the provisions of its law. 
ARTICLE 50 (a) Members of the National Assembly may 
not be questioned over the opinions and 
suggestions they introduce during their 
exercise of the tasks of their posts. 
(b) None of the members of the Assembly may 
be pursued or arrested for an offence 
committed during the meetings without 
obtaining the Assembly's permission, 
except in case of being held in the act 
of crime. 
ARTICLE 51 The National Assembly shall undertake to: 
(a) Lay down its internal regulations, 
specify its cadre, approve its budget 
and appoint its personnel.Remunerations 
and nllownnccs of its President and 
Members shall be defined by a law. 
(b) Provide the rules for charging and 
trying its members in case of their 
committing one of the acts provided in 
Article 56 of this Constitution. 
ARTICLE 52 The National Assembly shall consider the 
draft laws proposed by the Revolutionary 
Command Council within a period of fifteen 
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days from the date of their arrival to the 
bureau of the National Assembly's Presidency 
If the Assembly approves the draft, it shall 
be submitted to the President of the 
Republic, to promulgate it. But if the 
National Assembly rejected or amended it, it 
shall be returned to the Revolutionary 
Command Council. If the amendment were 
approved by the Revolutionary Command 
Council, it shall be submitted to the 
President to promulgate it. But if the 
Revolutionary Command Council insists on its 
opinion in the second reading, the draft 
shall be returned to the National Assembly 
to be presented in a joint sitting of the 
Council and the Assembly. The decision 
issued by the majority of two thirds shall 
be considered as final. 
ARTICLE 53 The National Assembly shall consider, within 
a period of fifteen days, the draft Laws 
forwarded to it by the President of the 
Republic. If the Assembly rejects the draft, 
it shall be returned to the President of the 
Republic with the statement of the reasons 
of rejection. But if the Assembly accepts 
the draft, then it shall be submitted to the 
Revolutionary Command Council , and if it 
approves the draft, then it shall be liable 
for promulgation. But if the National 
Assembly amends the draft, then it shall be 
submitted to the Revolutionary Command 
Council, and if it approves the draft, it 
shall be liable for promulgation. But if the 
Revolutionary Command Council rejects the 
103 
amendment or makes another amendment, it 
shall be returned again to the National 
Assembly within one week. If the National 
Assembly adopts the opinion of the Revolu-
tionary Command Council, the draft shall be 
submitted to the President of the Republic 
for promulgation. But if the National 
Assembly insists, in the second reading, on 
its opinion, then a joint sitting of the 
Council and the Assembly shall be held, and 
the draft adopted by the majority of two 
thirds shall be considered as final, and it 
shall be submitted to the President of the 
Republic for promulgation. 
ARTICLE 54 The National Assembly shall consider draft 
laws presented by one quarter of its members 
in affairs other than military matters and 
public security affairs. 
If the Assembly approves the draft law, it 
shall be submitted to the Revolutionary 
Command Council to consider it within 
fifteen days from the date of its arrival to 
the Council's Bureau. 
If it is approved by the Revolutionary 
Command Council, it shall be submitted to 
the President of the Republic for promul-
gation. 
But if the Revolutionary Command Council 
rejects or amends it, the draft shall be 
returned to the National Assembly. If the 
latter insists on its opinion, in the second 
reading, a joint session of the Council and 
the Assembly shall be convened under the 
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presidency of the Chairman of the Revolu-
tionary Command Council or his Deputy. The 
draft issued by the majority of two thirds 
shall be considered as final and shall be 
submitted to the President of the Republic 
for promulgation. 
ARTICLE 55 (a) Deputies of the President of the 
Republic and the Ministers and those 
who are in ranks similar to them shall 
be entitled to attend the meetings of 
the National Assembly and participate 
in discussions. 
(b) The National Assembly may, after the 
approval of the President of the 
Republic, call the Ministers in order 
to make an enquiry or explanation. 
ARTICLE 56 The President of the National Assembly and 
every member in it are held responsible 
before the Assembly for violating the 
Constitution, perjuring the obligations of 
the Constitutional oath or for any act or 
conduct the National Assembly deems as 
detrimental to the honour of responsibility 
he exercises. 
CHAPTER THREE 
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
ARTICLE 57 (a) The President of the Republic is the 
President of the State and the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. 
He shall undertake the executive power 
directly or through the Council of 
Ministers. 
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(b) The President of the Republic shall 
promulgate the necessary ordinances for 
exercising his powers as prescribed in 
this Constitution. 
ARTICLE 58 The President of the Republic shall directly 
exercise the following powers: 
(a) Preserve the independence of the 
country and integrity of its lands, 
protect its interior and exterior 
security and protect the rights and 
freedom of citizens. 
(b) Supervise the application of the 
Constitution, laws, resolutions, 
judicial decisions and development 
projects in all parts of the Republic 
of Iraq. 
(c) Appoint Deputies for the President of 
the Republic and release them from 
their posts. 
(d) Appoint the Ministers and release them 
from their posts. 
(e) Appoint civil and religious judges and 
civil and military officials of the 
State, and terminate their services in 
accordance with the law. 
(f) Appoint and accredit Iraqi diplomatic 
representatives in the Arab and foreign 
countries, and in international 
conferences and organizations. 
(g) Grant military ranks and medals in 
accordance with the law. 
(h) Hold negotiations and conclude inter-
national agreements and treaties. 
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(i) Accept diplomatic and international 
representatives and demand their with-
drawal . 
(j) Approve capital punishments and issue 
special amnesty. 
(k) Direct the control of the work of the 
Ministries and general institutions 
and coordinate them. 
ARTICLE 59 Deputies of the President of the Republic 
and the Ministers shall be held responsible 
before the President of the Republic for 
their works, and he is entitled to refer any 
one of them to trial, in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution, for 
functional errors committed, for taking 
advantage of, or abusive use of, his powers. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
ARTICLE 60 (a) The Council of Ministers shall consist 
of the Ministers and be presided over 
by the President of the Republic. 
(b) The President of the Republic shall 
call the Council of Ministers to meet 
and conduct its meetings. 
ARTICLE 61 The Council of Ministers shall exercise the 
following powers: 
(a) Initiate draft laws and refer them to 
the proper legislative authority. 
(b) Issue administrative regulations and 
decisions in accordance with the law. 
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(c) Appoint civil officials of the State 
and promote them, in accordance with 
the law. 
(d) Submit the general plan of the State. 
(e) Submit the general budget of the State 
and the budgets annexed to it. 
(f) Conclude and grant loans, and supervise 
organizing and administering currency. 
(g) Declare a full or partial emergency and 
terminate it in accordance with the 
law. 
(h) Supervise general utilities and 
official and semi-official institutions 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE JUDICIARY 
ARTICLE 62 (a) The Judiciary is independent and no 
power shall be exercised over it except 
the law. 
(b) The right to litigation shall be gua-
ranteed to all citizens. 
(c) The law shall define the manner of 
courts formation, their grades, juris-
dictions, stipulations for appointing 
civil and religious judges,transferring 
and promoting them, litigating and 
retiring them. 
ARTICLE 63 The law shall define the posts of the Public 
Prosecution, its stipulations for appoint-
ing Public Prosecutors and their deputies 
and the rules for transferring and promoting 
them, litigating and retiring them. 
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PART FIVE 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
ARTICLE 64 (a) No one shall be member of the Revolu-
tionary Command Council and no one 
shall be deputy to the President of the 
Republic or Minister except whoever is 
Iraqi by birth and from Iraqi parents 
by birth also. 
(b) Members of the Revolutionary Command 
Council, deputies to the President of 
the Republic and the Ministers shall 
not exercise a free profession or a 
commercial business, or purchase from 
the state properties, sell to the State 
some of their properties, or barter for 
them while holding their posts. 
ARTICLE 65 (a) The provisions of this Constitution 
shall remain in force until the Perma-
nent Constitution is promulgated. 
(b) This Constitution shall not be amended 
except by the Revolutionary Command 
Council by a majority of two thirds of 
its members. 
ARTICLE 66 (a) Laws shall be published in the Official 
Gazette and shall come into force from 
the date of their publication except 
otherwise provided therein. 
(b) Laws shall have no retroactive effect 
except if otherwise provided therein 
and this exclusion shall not include 
Criminal Laws and laws of taxes and 
financial dues. 
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ARTICLE 67 This Interim Constitution, the laws and 
judicial decisions shall be promulgated and 
executed in the name of the people. 
ARTICLE 68 All laws and resolutions of the Revolu-
tionary Command Council enforced prior to 
the promulgation of this Constitution shall 
remain in force and they may not be amended 
or abrogated except through the manner 
provided in this Constitution. 
ARTICLE 69 The Chairman of the Revolutionary Command 
Council shall undertake the promulgation of 
this Constitution and its publication in the 
Official Gazette. 
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APPENDIX - C 
CHRONOLOGY OF COUPS D'ETAT AND REVOLUTIONS 
I. IRAQ 
July 14, 1958 (The Iraqi Revolution) Coup d'etat 
led by Brig. Gen. Abdul-Karim Kassem and 
Col. Abdul-Salam Aref against the Hashemite 
monarchy; King Faisal II, Crown Prince Abdul 
Ilah and members of royal family massacred 
and Nuri al-Said killed following day; pro-
clamation of a republic. 
March 8, 1959 Abortive coup d'etat of Col. Abdul 
Wahab Shawaf in Mosul against the Kassem 
regime. 
February 8, 1963 (Revolution of 14 Ramadan): Coup 
by dissident officers including Aref against 
Kassem who was shot on following day. 
July 3, 1963 Abortive attempt of Communists 
against the Ba'th regime after skirmish at 
Rashid camp, 
November 13, 1963 Abortive attempt of the parti-
sans of the radical Ba'thist. Ali Saleh al-
Saddi led by Mundhir al-Wandawi to overthrow 
the ruling Ba'th faction. 
November 18, 1963 Coup by President Aref and mode-
rate Ba'th Officers against Ba'th national 
guard: end of the Ba'th regime. 
Ill 
7. September 16, 1965 Abortive coup by pro-Nasserist 
prime minister. Aref Abdul-Razzaq, against 
Aref regime in favor of unity with Egypt. 
8. June 30, 1966 Second abortive coup by pro-Nasserist 
Abdul-Razzaq began in Mosul and ended in 
Baghdad. 
9. July 17, 1968 Coup by moderate officers Ibrahim 
Daoud and Abdul-Razzaq Nayef in cooperation 
with Ba'th leader Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr 
against President Abdul-^Rahman Aref. 
10. July 30, 1968 President al-Bakr's coup against his 
former partners. Daoud and Nayef, and 
restoration of Ba'th rule. 
II. SYRIA 
1. January 14, 1958 Syrian officers meet Nasser in 
Cairo and force the hand of the Quwatli 
government to accept unity with Egypt. 
2. September 28, 1961 (Revolution of 28 September): 
Coup by Syrian officers against Nasserist 
regime; end of the unity with Egypt and 
restoration of normal parliamentary rule. 
3. March 28, 1962 Coup by Col. Abdul-Karim Nahlawi 
against the parliamentary regime of 
President Qudsi; officers divided. Nahlawi 
and his group exiled. Parliament dissolved, 
Qudsi restored to presidency. 
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4. April 1, 1962 Abortive pro-Nasserist coup in 
Aleppo (coup within the previous coup). 
5. January 13, 1963 Abortive coup of Nahlawi against 
Qudsi regime. 
6. March 8, 1963 (Revolution of March 8): Coup by 
dissident Ba'Chist, Nasserist and other 
officers led by Col. Ziad Hariri, and fall of 
semi-constitutional regime of Qudsi and his 
prime minister Khalid al-Azem. 
7. July 4-8, 1963 Ba'th coup against General Hariri 
and his exile to Paris. 
8. July 18, 1963 Abortive pro-Nasserist coup led by 
Jassem Alwan against Ba'th regime; General 
Amin Hafez emerged as Ba'th strongman. 
9. December 19, 1965 Coup by Ba'th national command 
supported by Hafez and dissolution of 
regional (Syrian) command; resignation of 
Dr. Zuayyen's two days later. 
10. February 23, 1966 Coup by dissolved Ba'th regional 
command led by Salah Jedid and Selim Hatoum 
against General Hafez and the national 
command; More leftist Ba'th elements 
dominant. 
11- September 8, 1966 Abortive coup of Selim Hatoum 
against radical regime of Salah Jedid. 
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